

## BOKO HARAM CRISIS IN NIGERIA: PERPETUAL VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN DISPLACEMENT.

by

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### Abstract:

The purpose of this study is to evaluate how the Terrorist Group has influenced humanitarian crises in Northern Nigeria, especially in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. It also shows how Boko Haram's increased operations keep on going to have disastrous emergency relief repercussions for the Northeast region, Nigerian society, and surrounding countries. When variables like Impact on Human Causalities (IHC), Food Insecurity (FI), and Displaced People Persons (IDPs) were held constant, the results revealed a significant collaboration between the Boko Haram insurgency and human tragedy. However, no such relationship was observed when specifications such as property loss (PL) and Government Response (GR) were assumed to be constant. To confront the risk faced by foreign crises and the Boko Haram insurgency in the province, the paper urges the Nigerian government to set priorities for lessening human casualties, loss of self-sufficiency, vulnerability, and reconciling internally displaced persons into society.

**Keywords:** *Insurgency, humanitarian emergencies, government, security, violence, and Boko Haram.*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria currently faces different security concerns throughout its land, especially instability growing in the north and south. Whereas a lengthy Islamist insurgent and continuous militant operations, frequently referred to as 'banditry,' threaten to wreak havoc in the north, the Biafra separatist movement also wreaked havoc in the south. The ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) is an initiative that will be completed in 2022. frequency of organized political conflict occurrences in Nigeria has increased by 20% by 2021. Over 9,950 people were killed because of the bloodshed, up roughly 31% from 2020.

Following current military efforts to fight the uprising, the danger presented mostly in the northeast by Islamist extremists in 2021 and remained, with said Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP) Lake Chad offshoot acquiring increasing authority and having an effect (New York Times, 15 October 2021). After

Muhammadu Buhari has been elected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2015, he promised to bring Boko Haram's struggle must be ended (New York Times, 14 April 2015).

What is the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria? From the so-called Islamic State to Boko Haram, such insurgencies represent rising worldwide intimidations to global security. In this work, I propose to precisely examine the cause of revolutions by adopting the state-centered approach which argues that uprisings are caused by structural vulnerabilities in confident kind situations. The Political Instability Task Force catches that incomplete inequalities with factions are extremely exposed to insurgency. In heart, an uprising inception has a lot to do with the activities of factionalized political leaders.

#### 1.1 Objectives of the Study

The objective of this study is to investigate how the activities of factionalized political elites, in a partial democratic state, makes a state highly vulnerable to an insurgency. The study adopts the case of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, deportment in mind its current rise in shape and the study also requests to diverge from their

emphasis by showing how the activities of political bests have mobilized and given political relevance to the Boko Haram sects.

### 1.2 Statement of the problem

In view of the study had developed four level problem which necessitate the studies.

First level: When sections of political leaders compete for political power at the national level on the basis of individuality, groups emerge at the subnational level in protection of these identities.

Second level: Identity groups gain political significance when divisions of the political leaders ascribe such applicability to them in the process of contending for political influence.

Third level: Once a fundamentalist identity group becomes administratively relevant, it makes extremist burdens which stimulus resentment between it and the presiding political leaders.

Finally level: The rise of fundamentalist insurgencies goes unchecked in a partial democracy with political elites factionalized along identity lines.

Therefore study proceeds as follows: the following unit examines the present state of the literature on the reason behind the rise of Boko haram crisis in Nigeria begings, as well as the activities of Boko Haram in the northern part of Nigeria. The other segment on a state-centered insurgency, violence, conflicts and the conceptual framework of the study which has been examines. The last section represents of the research comprised of conclusions in light of a critical review of the empirical evidence, challenges and suggestion.

### 1.3 Scope of the study

The study focus on the Boko haram crisis in Nigeria: perpetual violence, conflicts, and humanitarian displacement in the study areas of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa state in Northern art of Nigeria as the case study.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

However, His government has tried to accomplish so (BBC News, 12 June 2021), with Fundamentalists playing a significant role as extremists responsible in early 2019, organized partisan assassinations accounted for further about 19% of all political homicides in the country before (BBC News, 12 June 2021). Although there was a major increase in guerrilla engagement in 2021 compared to 2020, terrorism had endured and diversified.

Conflicts between Boko Haram and the government of Nigeria's breakaway organization, Lake Chad is part of the ISWAP initiative, erupted in 2021 in the battle for dominance

+Regarding territorial sovereignty in northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad region The JAS's Abubakar Shekau group commander has murdered in Sambisa Forest in May, allegedly by blowing up his explosive vest during the battle with ISWAP fighters (BBC News, 10 June 2021). Hundreds of JAS faction fighters declared loyalty to ISWAP after his killing (Reuters, 29 June 2021), but hundreds succumbed in the months that followed, to military officials (New York Times, 25 September 2021).

By November 2021, Radical Islamic fighters surrender in large numbers, according to the authorities. (Guardian, 10 October 2021). With rebel strongholds by leftover JAS faction members, ISWAP is an acronym that stands for cementing in the areas surrounding Lake Chad, it has had an impact.

Al-Barnawi Abu Musab Abu, the head of the ISWAP, died in October, according to the Nigerian military. ISWAP did not confirm his death, though (BBC News, 17 October 2021).

Although the Boko Haram uprising had historically largely centered in the northeast, notably in Borno state, sources suggest that in 2021, ISWAP and JAS militants may seize many areas in Niger state (VOA, 2 October 2021). These extremists are also said to have set up

camps in the state, allowing them to expand armed activities closer to the Federal Capital Territory. The existence in Shiro and Rafi municipalities (Local government area, as well as Borgu LGA along to Benin boundary, Islamist militants, have been active, was verified by the Niger local government in November. This reflects a pattern of extremists expanding into areas in which they had earlier been mainly non-existent. (Premium Times, 27 November 2021)

In the north-central and northwest areas of Nigeria, ethnic paramilitary operations accounted for approximately a 1/3 of all political groups are structured violent occurrences documented Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) is expected to release a report in 2021. Civil unrest by militias sometimes known as "bandits," began in the state of Zamfara in 2011 and spread to other states over time in 2021, established political atrocities committed by such groups surged by 51% over the previous year, with Kaduna state accounting for 30% of militant involvement. (Daily Trust, 12 September 2021).

These groups usually specialize in livestock theft, hostage abduction, and village pillaging from Nigeria's unregulated woodlands. According to ACLED data, those groups murdered over 2,800 people in 2021, a 260 percent rise from the previous year. This amount also outnumbers the number of people killed by Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgent groups in 2021. (Al Jazeera, 9 January 2022)

Furthermore, the number of kidnappings and forced arbitrary detention taken out from these organizations almost quadrupled last year relative to 2020, since gunmen deepening to kidnap for extortion as a means of revenue (Vox, 6 August 2021). Most notably, gunmen kidnapped hundreds of schoolgirls in Zamfara and Kaduna states in February and July, respectively (DW, 6 July 2021). Armed groups had essentially taken control of territory, enforcing levies and time

limits, and restricting transit in the security vacuum caused by the lack of functional authority (Vanguard, 6 September 2021; 23 November 2021).

In addition, in 2021, effective political violence by Fulani groups persisted, notably in Nigeria's Middle Belt. In 2021, the number of occurrences featuring Fulani groups decreased somewhat, but they were less fatal than the year before. Fulani terrorist assaults claimed the lives of around 820 civilians in 2021, many of them were from rural areas. For example, Fulani gunmen killed Nasarawa state's Tiv peasants in December, ostensibly along with retribution for the murder of a relative in the Obi Local Government Area.

At least 20 people died in the fighting, while tens of thousands were displaced. The creation of localized paramilitary organizations has resulted from an absence of government measures to safeguard communities from these attacks (New York Times, 10 December 2018). According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) statistics, battles among Fulani militants and local self-defense groups resulted in the deaths of above 45 persons that year. (The Punch, 20 December 2021)

Civil unrest between In Biafra, Nigeria, the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) is a separatist organization. The Eastern Security Network (ESN) is a paramilitary group (ESN), that increased considerably in the southeast in 2021. ESN was created as the IPOB military branch in December 2020, ostensibly to safeguard the Igbo people from Fulani gunmen and government bloodshed (Twitter @MaziNnamdiKanu, 14 December 2020). After a government mandate to "tear down the structures of the ESN" in the area, In January, fighting among state security personnel and IPOB/ESN fighters erupted. (Independent Nigeria, 25 January 2022).

Nnamdi Kanu, the head of the IPOB, was captured in Kenya in June and deported to Nigeria to face charges. IPOB has issued provincial stay instructions to protest Kanu's detention since then (Al Jazeera, 17 November 2021), which has been a victim of bloodshed on numerous occasions. Even though the fact that IPOB discontinued weekly Monday stay instructions in August (Vanguard, 20 August 2021), the instructions have indeed been sporadically applied since then, while segments of the movement continue to enforce them on regular basis (Vanguard, 19 November 2021). Violence and kidnappings of local leaders increased dramatically last year, especially in the south. Gunmen ambushed abducted and killed at least three traditional rulers in December, prompting IPOB to criticize the assassinations as well as the state's failure to stop their perceived apathy horrific acts are avoided and punished (Vanguard, 22 December 2021).

Armed men set fire to INEC's headquarters in Anambra State which was believed to be IPOB members. Members then attempted to attack the Police 'B' Divisional Headquarters, which is near the INEC headquarters but instead were repulsed by the on-duty operatives.

In Awka, the state capital in south-east Nigeria, both the electoral referee's office and the police station are situated



Fig 1 Represent the Indigenous people of Biafra on March 28, 2022

Armed men set fire to INEC's headquarters in Anambra State which was believed to be IPOB members. Members then attempted to attack the Police 'B' Divisional Headquarters, which is near the INEC headquarters but instead were repulsed by the on-duty operatives.

The incident reportedly took place on Sunday, 20/02/2022 In Awka, the state capital in southeast Nigeria, and is the latest in a string of street thug attacks on INEC offices in the zone.



Figure 2: representing the attack by Boko haram on railway Kaduna Abuja way 2022

### ***Historical background and the reason behind the rise of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.***

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, which began in July 2009, was just another chapter in the country's repeating cycle of violent uprisings, riots, and disturbances. Given Nigerian society's diversity, religious sensitivities, and the country's lengthy period of military control (during which a major portion of the population was heavily armed), the situation could not have been any different. The strong attempt by Islamic extremists to impose a religious philosophy on a legally recognized secular nation, however, is concerning. The impacts of the riots on the country are several. 1 is a symptom of increased religious sensitivity and inadequate deterrent tactics in the past. The Boko Haram insurgency was not the first violent attempt to impose a religious doctrine on a secular Nigerian society, but it did broaden the scope of efforts at Islamic revivalism, as did the first major attempt and subsequent small-scale

attempts. (Salisu SalisuShuaibu & Mohd Afandi Salleh, 2015)

Boko haram is not a new insurgency; their activities can be traced back to President Olusegun Obasanjo's tenure when they were not well-armed and were seen as malcontents among some Nigerians or a disgusting gang by others. Insurgency, which is defined as a revolt against authority in which the rebels are not recognized as belligerents (lawful warriors), has occurred in Nigeria over the years; however, not all rebellions are insurgencies. (Muhammed & Oladimeji, 2017).

Nigeria is Africa's most populated country, earning it the moniker "Africa's Monster" due to its enormity. Nigeria has a wealth of natural resources, such as crude oil, limestone, zinc, copper, and a range of other minerals. The diversity of Nigeria's cultures, languages, ethnicities, and faiths is part of the country's natural attractiveness.

The reason from the past If one looks back far enough in Nigerian history, one will see that the country was never truly united; instead, it was a collection of disparate people forced together to share a state and a geographical location, among other things. It should therefore come as no surprise if our colonial overlords bring these people together to fight each other because conflict is inevitable when people with opposing beliefs and viewpoints are forced to share resources. (Isokpan et al., 2016).

According to research, a wide range of people, both ordinary and distinguished, have expressed their views on what they feel are the reasons for the rise of the Nigerian insurgency. This article will look at some of the arguments that have been proposed.

1. Politics It is unarguable that Radical Islam has grown into this; it seems to be an instrument that politicians use to their advantage and against each other. The kidnapping of secondary school

girls in Chibok brought to light the lengths to which people are ready to go to achieve power because the subject of the kidnapped kids had never been mentioned since the previous administration had been ousted.

2. Over-hype in the media If there's one thing Nigerian media is excellent for, it's exaggerating things as if they're being paid to do so or generating more income by scaring Nigerians. If there are only two reasons why individuals commit these violent and horrible deeds, one of them is to be noticed to instill terror in the minds of those who see it, and the Nigerian media has aided them in this respect thus far.

3. Borders without protection, to be honest, Nigeria's northern region lacks borders, but the southern regions have well-defined borders that are guarded against unauthorized foreign migration. Borders are well-positioned in the south, making it difficult to cross them.

4. Religious and ethical issues This cause may be traced back to Boko Haram's inception when they set out to combat western education, which they see as "Haram," or "an abomination" in English. Not to add that those who battle for the cause by dying themselves and other humans are guaranteed paradise as well as 99 virgins, according to rumors. Individuals who are recruited to become insurgents are nevertheless subjected to religious and ethnic conditioning.

5. Government blunder When the same politicians who utilize these rebels to spread their bad intentions hold leadership positions, you can't expect them to take any sensible steps to resolve the problem. Every year, the government submits a budget that provides lump quantities of money to various sectors of the system; nonetheless, we observe no discernible improvement in the nation's current situation as compared to its prior state.

### 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

## Insurgency, Violence, and Conflicts in Nigeria.

**3.1 Insurgency:** Nigeria's protracted conflict against armed resistance factions, as well as persistent corruption in government, pose a danger to the country's security and its democratic authenticity. Throughout 2011, Boko Haram, which was one of Africa's biggest prominent Islamist militant organizations, has carried out terrorist assaults against religious and political targets, and citizens in bustling marketplaces and communities (Okolie & Nnamani, 2016).

The abduction of nearly 200 girls at secondary school in April 2014 brought public attention to Boko Haram's continued danger and the government's incapacity to combat it. 103 girls have now been released after the Global Forum for the Red Cross facilitated talks involving Terrorist Groups as well as the Nigerian government (Ogbonna & Ruiz Jiménez, 2017)

President Muhammadu Buhari, a retired military ruler who beat president Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 on such an antiterrorism campaign, was voted on that platform in 2015, but Nigeria's political and economic issues had hampered the war over Radical Islamists. In contrast to the armed battle, Nigeria's security is threatened by the persisting misallocation of oil income, significant levels of corruption, and insecurity in the Middle Belt area.

Following a spike in Boko Haram-related bloodshed in 2019 and 2021, the number of people killed by the organization has dropped significantly. The Nigerian military has pressed Terrorist Groups out of several provinces in northeastern Nigeria, with help from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, however, the gang still safeguards a few settlements and compartments of land and decided to carry out dangerous terrorist acts and kidnap innocent citizens, largely women, and children. A Boko

Haram group called Islamic State West Africa abducted about a hundred students in February 2022. A couple of months later, all were liberated. The fighting has been restricted throughout the Muslim northeast, notably in Adamawa and Yobe states, but huge numbers of people have been uprooted throughout the area. The Nigerian Army stated in March 2022 that two thousand internally displaced persons will be returning home. Security troops battling insurgents were suspected of grave crimes against humanity.

**3.2 Violence:** In northern Nigeria, ISWAP is growing as a unified force while also expanding its operations holdings farther into the middle because of internal fighting among Boko Haram and ISWAP, as well as internal strife among Boko Haram members. In 2022, it is expected that ISWAP would consolidate its control throughout the Lake Chad Basin and even beyond, after this momentous turn in Nigeria's 12-year-old Islamist uprising. However, in the northwest and north-central Nigeria, where warlords dominate Islamist extremists, the scenario threatens the country's sovereignty much more. Furthermore, these militants strive to advance their combat capabilities, gunning down fighter aircraft and moving to neighboring states to avoid combat actions (BBC News, 21 July 2021).

In 2022, people will most certainly suffer the burden of such wars. In their war in the north in 2021 with militant groups, government troops sometimes attacked innocent people. In September, for example, scores of civilians were killed because of two airstrikes pursuing Islamist extremists. Such disasters might occur if military actions are expanded in 2022. (Reuters, 29 September 2021) (Washington Times, 16 September 2021; Washington Times, 16 September 2021). In Nigeria's North Central, there is very little hope of reducing ethnic and

sectarian violence unless the government takes effective initiatives to solve the root causes of the conflict, such as crop failure land-use change usage, and relocation. Fulani armed violence is one of Nigeria's major security problems, with hundreds of people killed and thousands homeless by 2021. Even though the fact that violence reduced by almost 44.6 percent in 2021 relative to the maxima of 2018, the threat of recurrence as well as further damaging Nigeria's security in 2022 remains. (Al Jazeera, 29 November 2021).

Campaign season political interests already have begun in preparation for the February 2023 polls, which will undoubtedly pose new security concerns. Political violence plagued the most recent national elections in 2019, much of which were committed by military and law enforcement officials, and multiple cases of violence also were recorded during the 2021 local council elections, notably in the states of Anambra and Ekiti.

An insurgency is a violent act committed by an entire class of people to challenge or reject the implementation of the law or the operation of governments, to revolt against the state's government agencies, or to actively engage in the insurgency (Salihu, 2021). Rebellion, as defined above, is a violation of a country's criminal treaties and regulations treaty obligations in the given situations Whenever an invasion of helpless citizens and property occurs, permanent injuries, deaths, and property loss, as well as forced or prevalent domestic displacement of people. When it drives enterprises ahead from poor security areas, criminal conspiracy, violent extremism, killing, dishonesties against mortality, and liquidation. Insurgencies, on the other hand, have historically requested to replace the original order and one that is more suitable to their democratic, economic, ideological, or religious goals (Muhammed & Oladimeji, 2017).

**3.3 Conflicts:** Insurgent group is a fight to rule a contested political area between a state (or a combination of states or foreign forces) and one or maybe more widely based quasi adversaries," Kilcullen explains. He also separates both classical and current uprisings, going to claim that the above seek to alter the current order, whereas the distinction seeks to evacuate foreign substances from their territory or fill an authority void (Kilcullen, 2006).

There is a contemporary crisis and conflict that led to humanitarian problems. A refugee problem is described as a condition in which new relationships or even well are compromised although an immediate and appropriate decision is required possibly requiring just one response and special measures. The primary goal is to act quickly and appropriately to prevent threats to life or well-being (Macrae, 2002). A philanthropic crisis is defined as "any situation in which there is an asymptomatic and prevalent threat to life, health, or necessities that exceeds the mental wellbeing of families and organizations" (D, n.d.). This necessarily involves treatments and comments that go well beyond symptom relief, such as income support and coping strategy diversification. Humanitarian crises continue to be one of the most having to press development problems of the 21st millennium.

Despite continued measures to overcome poverty and inequality as they affect developing countries' most disadvantaged people, environmental sustainability agendas and applications did not appear to pay as Until recently, there was a lot of focus on all kinds of defenseless individuals and groups. Initially, long-term systems were the emphasis of sustainable growth, aimed at addressing poverty, inequity, environmental destruction, and other issues, as well as structural issues impeding growth, prosperity, and conservation. Humanitarian efforts in war zones and accident areas, on the other hand, are

typically focused on protecting lives, stress reduction, and disseminating relief supplies (OCHA, 2021).



Figure 3: Represent military recovered some arms from the militance

#### ***4.The impact of Boko Haram Crisis: Humatarial Displacement due to the Insurgency in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe State.***

As per (Angerbrand & Nordiska Afrikainstitutet., 2017), the Terrorist Group has resulted in thousands of innocent casualties in both 2009 and 2021. In Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, many women were becoming divorcees, and most of the kids have become children. According to the Nigerian Surveillance Tracking service 2021, the Boko Haram sect carried out 94 suicide bombings in Nigeria's northern portion in both 2009 and 2021, utilizing a variety of methods such as militant attacks, bombardments, detonations, closing time missile strikes, mass genocide raids, easy for potential, and abductions. In 2009, two thousand three hundred and twenty-two individuals were murdered in these occurrences, especially in comparison to four thousand in 2017. In 2018, 3,560 people died, and 3,700 people will die in 2019. In 2019, 4,420 people died, with no fewer than 5,000 people dying in 2021. (Salihu, 2021).

People were evacuated in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The sect's increasingly broad operations have had a severe effect on the public, particularly women and children, as illustrated by

the growing incidence of orphaned children in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states (Hajaya, 2021). Since 2009, the sect's increased operations have increased sexuality and gender violent behavior. Female internal and external displaced persons (IDPs) in detention centers and host communities are thought to be regular basis forced to listen to gender and sexual violence (Kehinde & Ogunnubi, 2019).

According to the United Nations Organization for the Administration of Philanthropic Activities, the number of internally displaced people in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states has steadily increased (UNOCHA). Between 2009 and 2010, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) expanded to 130,000, and between 2010 and 2011, it expanded to 150,000. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of displaced persons (IDPs) accelerated to 200,000. The amount of internally displaced persons (IDPs) increased to 390,000 between 2012 and 2013 but fell to 250,000 between May and March 2014. It increased to 50,300 people from May to June 2014, and it enhanced to almost half the population from August to November (Oyewole, 2015).

Figure 4: represents, The 'Boko Haram zone' might be home to the world's largest humanitarian disaster in 2022, a UN humanitarian worker in Kolkata, New Mate Borno State, counseled internally displaced persons.



Figure 4: represents another Nigeria IDP Camp that is in serious need of humanitarian assistance



Figure5: shows According to the European Union, two million Nigerians are malnourished and homeless in Nigeria's northeast. According to Samuela Isopi, the new head of the EU and ECOWAS delegation, almost two million families have been displaced from their homes in the North-East.



Figure 6: UNHCR data enabled the presence of massive departures to Northeast Nigeria, according to UNHCR Spokesperson Babar Baloch 2022.

In northeast Nigeria's Gubio camp, more than 40,000 forcibly displaced people live, with humanitarian requirements expected to rise dramatically in 2022. Image credit: IOM/Jorge Galindo Jeffrey Labovitz, Director of Operations and Emergencies of the International Organization for Migration, talks with residents of the Dikwa IDP camp, Image credit: Committee Made In north-east Nigeria's Gubio camp, more than 40,000 internally displaced people live, with

emergency needs expected to rise dramatically in 2022. Image credit: International organization for migration Galindo Jeffrey Labovitz, Director of Operations and Emergencies of the International Organization for Migration, talks with residents of the Dikwa IDP camp. Image credit: IOM/Kazi Made unremitting conflict in north-east Nigeria will result in new waves of relocation to overcrowded camps. In conjunction with humanitarian partners, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has started implementing a new prevention and reduction approach

According to a recent United Nations study, the number of asylum seekers and refugees in north-eastern Nigeria is growing, highlighting the region's ongoing humanitarian calamity caused by the Boko Haram insurgency.



Fig 7: represents the IDP collecting relief materials from NGO's

As per the United Nations High Commission for Refugees recently issued International Latest survey, Nigeria had 2.4 million internally displaced individuals at the end of 2021, up 29% from the previous year.

Refugee camps will be overloaded in 2022. In Borno State, in which four out of five internally

displaced people (IDPs) currently reside in overpopulated facilities, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has begun implementing a new prevention and reduction strategic plan in partnering with humanitarian collaborators, to reduce the goal of reducing congestion from over 58 percent of the encampments.

#### **4.1 Government response to Boko Haram crisis.**

The Nigerian government reacts by coordinating emergency rescue activities for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and providing agricultural supplies to peasants in North-East Nigeria thru the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA).

In 2013, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) developed the Comprehensive Action Plans in numerous areas across Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States to address humanitarian crises such as food insecurity, hunger, and internally displaced people diseases. Implementation of a five-year development strategy (2016-2021) within NCFR, with accountability for all IDPs and refugee issues in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.

Since 2011, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has expanded society's first-aid services and galvanized emergency water/sanitation measures through the reinforcement of its field activities in settlements in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.

Emergency treatment, safe drinking water, nutrition, and other vital daily necessities were provided to stranded residents in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states to help address their pressing problems.

Since 2021, more goods and services, including food, shelter, health, water, sanitation, hygiene (WASH), and nutrition, have been delivered to the swelling number of Nigerian refugees in

Chad, Niger, and Cameroun. (Red Cross International, 31 July 2021)

Although the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is State and municipal governments are officially in charge of disaster response across Nigeria, with the highly specialized agencies in charge of their areas. When Boko Haram's activities in northeast Nigeria began in 2009, NEMA did not intervene, as required by Act 12 as provided for in section 50 of 1999 for emergency management in the country. As an outcome, many people are finding themselves homeless and vulnerable. The authority's and the administration's significant absence lasted until 2015 when widespread outrage erupted. The humanistic conditions in the country had deteriorated by this point, making the interaction between any of these agencies extremely difficult (Duke et al., 2017).

In 2018, there were 1.3 million forcibly Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Granville, 2020) The figure had risen to 1,980,036 by 31 July 2019 (UNHCR, 2019), and was projected to reach 1,900,000 by June 2020. 3 The number of displaced persons (IDPs) in the jurisdictions of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe

The Nigerian Government It is hard to schedule multiple philanthropic activities in Nigeria due to the absence of a humanitarian law and policy foundation that clearly defines the tasks and responsibilities of human rights organizations. Along with its uncertainty, the lack of systematic data collection remains a major obstacle to identifying the exact total number of homeless persons truly needy, as well as denying humane public entities access to rural locations (Duke et al., 2017).

## **4. CONCLUSION**

Nigeria is a barometer for both the continental, as it is Africa's largest populated nation, greatest economy, and most well-known democracy. deteriorating economics, increased instability, and violent conflicts pose a threat to basic democratic growth. Nigeria has a huge amount of work to do to improve federal, statewide, and security teams and leadership because of the national and state elections in 2023, especially given the growing cynicism in government and other organizations. Nigeria's federal structure vests governors with significant authority over crises such as rancher conflicts, widening ethnic differences, violent lawlessness, and the Boko Haram uprising, all of which contribute to the country's various conflicts. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) draws with state governors, mainstream politicians, and community activists to develop and execute measures to lower bloodshed and enhance public stability. The Initiative works with a wide range of powerful personalities, applied to control, and uses its experience and gathering strength to help Nigeria policymakers in the United States, the continent, and throughout the globe.

In 2021, the advisory committee used its combined knowledge and ties to encourage high-level conversation among often factions fighting towards reconciliation throughout Nigeria and the Nigerian government, despite growing public mistrust. State and national authorities frequently turn to the advisory committee for advice on a variety of topics, ranging from appropriate positions to election violence to tribal disputes amongst Fulani herdsmen and farmers.

**5.1 Challenges:** Nigeria, like so many other developing countries facing internal extremism, has chosen a military combined with a harsh political security strategy. If a military response, defined by the government as combating terrorism against Boko Haram, was the shortest

and simplest, the duration and, ultimately, the expense amounted to a blunder. Expanding the number of incidental casualties might not have been worth the time and effort if the goal is to bring Boko Haram to its knees. If, as Bergen and Hoffman contend, "violence would not be a simple numbers game," the number of terrorists executed might not even necessarily imply a security triumph. Manipulating the narrative in the face of terrorists while preserving democracy is also a challenge.

As a result, the Nigerian government has had to deal between enthusiasm, depression, and secular humanism in its endeavor to wage propaganda war, tell the public about its side of the story, and rally support in its continuous struggle against terrorism. As a result, some media outlets' exaggeration and exaggeration of the terrorist danger may work against the government's efforts to wage an information war against Boko Haram. Another difficulty is the major disagreement across Nigerian actors about what the battle over counterterrorism must include. The Federal Government and the affected State Governments, for example, are at odds over mitigating tactics that have been adopted.

### **5.2 Suggestion**

1. The Nigerian government could make comes to ensure, through agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Disaster Management Agency (FEMA), to establish more displaced people's (IDP) prisons that are more suitable for the provision of appropriate water, sanitary conditions (WASH), and able to access IDPs, as well as the establishment of training and learning operating systems that may enable the nation.
2. The government of Nigeria wishes to make organization gets, through departments such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), construct more displaced

persons human (IDP) detention centers that are far more advantageous in terms of access to adequate water, sanitary, hygiene (WASH), and able to attain to IDPs, as well as the establishment of technical training establishments, projects which might aid internally displaced persons.

3. The administration should also perform to improve the economy of the north, notably the Located in northern. The attendance of Lake Chad and a great amount of productive lands is used to boost farming activities, create more employment for the young, and diminish poverty, particularly in Northeast Nigeria.

4. The Nigerian firm should implement more sophisticated techniques, such as quality tuition, particularly in rural areas of the Northeast. More efforts should be made to strengthen the establishment of more Almajiri (child street homeless person) schools, as well as to include college courses such as peace education to teach children and youths about the importance of living harmoniously and in peace with us all.

5. Nigerian security forces should be enhanced in a variety of ways, including welfare packages, salary systems, and officers suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Security personnel will be able to properly carry out their part in counterinsurgency against the Boko Haram sect if all these elements are kept in mind.

6. The Nigerian government should develop effective border security measures in collaboration with regional governments. These countries should also devise procedures to limit rebels' access to a firearm and funds; doing so would go a far toward minimizing Boko Haram exercise in the Lake Chad Basin.

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