

Location Privacy Protection for IoT-based WBANs using Anonymous Authentication and Improved AES Encryption

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Abstract— Advances in wireless communications, embedded systems, and integrated circuit technologies have enabled the wireless body area network (WBAN) to become a promising networking paradigm. Over the last decade, as an important part of the Internet of Things, we have witnessed WBANs playing an increasing role in modern medical systems because of its capabilities to collect real-time biomedical data through intelligent medical sensors in or around the patients' body and send the collected data to remote medical personnel for clinical diagnostics. WBANs not only bring us conveniences but also bring along the challenge of keeping data's confidentiality and preserving patients' privacy. In the previous, anonymous authentication (AA) schemes for WBANs were proposed to enhance security by protecting patients' identities and by encrypting medical data. However, many of these schemes are not secure enough. The AA scheme for WBANs and point out that it is not secure for medical applications by proposing an impersonation attack. In this project, propose an Improved AES with secure anonymous authentication framework for WBANs and prove that it is provably secure. The comprehensive analysis section shows that the proposed scheme overcomes the security weaknesses in the existing schemes and also provides low computation cost during anonymous authentication.

Keywords—: *Cross-modality, contrast enhancement, 2D histogram specification (HS), SSIM gradient, tumor segmentation.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Technological advances in various fields have led to significant improvements in the lives of people all over the world resulting in their increased life expectancy. For example, the life expectancy in the United States has prolonged 78.2 years from 69.8 years during the past 50 years. It is expected that about 81 million people will be 60 or older in 2050. The rapid growth in the number of aged people creates many economic and societal challenges as more aged people will suffer from chronic diseases and will not be able to take care of themselves. To take better care of aged people and reduce the burden on society, real-time monitoring of patients and remote

medical clinical diagnostics are going to be a crucial part of the healthcare system.

The wireless body area network (WBAN), initially proposed by Zimmerman [2], is a promising networking paradigm, which uses wireless personal area network (WPAN) technology. In recent years, the WBAN has attracted a lot of attention from both the research community and industry as an important part of the Internet of Things (IoT). A WBAN consists of many low power intelligent sensors, which are placed in or around the human body. Through these sensors, real-time monitoring could be implemented remotely. The typical WBAN application scenario where the WBAN collects real time biomedical data such as heart rate, blood pressure, and pulse and then sends the data to a remote medical server through mobile devices such as a personal digital assistant (PDA) or a smart phone. Based on this data, doctors and other medical personnel could get a patient's status and provide the appropriate clinical diagnostics. Therefore, the use and deployment of WBANs could help us to take care of aged people and patients by providing a reliable and robust health-monitoring service in the IoT environment.

The data collected or transmitted in WBANs are very sensitive and important because these are the basis of clinical diagnostics. Besides, privacy is also an important issue from the patient's perspective because biomedical data are highly confidential and should be handled, transmitted, and stored with care to prevent information leakage to unauthorized users. Therefore, authentication, data confidentiality, integrity, nonrepudiation, and privacy preservation should be guaranteed during all communications within the WBAN environment. To generalize the applications based on WBANs, IEEE 802.15.6 has been proposed to provide an international standard for reliable wireless communication in WBANs and the standard could support data rates ranging from 75.9 kb/s to 15.6 Mb/s. The standard describes security requirements and various security levels in WBANs. The standard also recommends four elliptic curve-based security schemes to achieve those goals. However, recent works show that those four security protocols are vulnerable to several attacks. Therefore, the standard is not

secure enough for some practical applications. To enhance security, anonymous authentication (AA) schemes for WBANs have been extensively studied to provide not only authentication and privacy preservation but also to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation based on a shared key

Since the WBAN connects with more important and sensitive patient related information, it is necessary to provide security and privacy to this information. Moreover, privacy preservation is also an essential problem for a patient because biological information is considered to be highly confidential. Therefore, the biological information should be stored and transmitted secretly to prevent any information leakage to illegal users. Hence, it is very important to safeguard the patient-related information against security breaches and to ensure the patients privacy

The proposed framework is developed based on four security necessities:

- (1) The privacy delivered by TA to WBAN users is a conditional privacy.
- (2) The construction of our anonymous authentication framework is based on the use of bilinear pairing.
- (3) In this proposed framework, TA is not required to keep the anonymous certificates of patients and medical experts. Instead, the patients and medical experts can make their own anonymous certificates to guard their privacy.
- (4) In the case of any problem, TA has the facility to efficiently revoke the privacy of a misbehaving medical expert to discover its actual identity. Then, TA keeps actual identity of the revoked medical expert in its revocation list.

II. LITERATURE SURVEY

The convergence of telecommunication technologies and the miniaturization of the electromechanical allowed an evolution proved in the world of wireless networks. This evolution is characterized by the emergence of a new generation of wireless personnel networks termed wireless body area networks that manages the human body functions. However, this technology has many requirements yet to be resolved. Security is the main challenge for this type of networks. In this paper, we propose a secret key exchange protocol using physiological signals in wireless body area networks (SKEP). This scheme allows a secure intersensor communication basing on physiological signals of the human body using cubic spline interpolation technique. Security analysis prove that our protocol guarantee data confidentiality and integrity in comparison with the previous protocol termed an efficient and secure key agreement scheme using physiological signals in body area networks [1].

The mobile ad hoc networks are a set of the autonomous nodes which arbitrarily moves out due to their autonomous nature. The topology of the network differs very often. Each and every autonomous node are powered by batteries with inadequate abilities and due to which the nodes fail to communicate the information packets from source to the target. The purpose is to design an energy efficient routing scheme in mobile ad hoc network with the aid of rough set calibration scheme. The rough set calibration scheme ultimately makes use of episodic based association where each and every metric like energy and distance are employed as the entity of rough set. Furthermore, the scheme aids in deciding the energy efficient routing. The analysis reveals that the scheme attempts for energy efficient routing with the aid of rough sets [2].

Author Khan Muhammad proposes a secure surveillance framework for IoT systems by intelligent integration of video summarization and image encryption by a fast probabilistic and lightweight algorithm for the encryption of keyframes prior to transmission, considering the memory and processing requirements of constrained devices which increase its suitability for IoT systems [3].

Rang Zhou discuss a new insider attack to the Cui's multi-key aggregate searchable encryption scheme, where the unauthorized inside users can guess the other users private keys. Then, a novel file-centric multi-key aggregate keyword searchable encryption (Fc-MKA-KSE) system is proposed for the IIoT data in the file-centric framework. Specifically, author present two formal security models, namely the security models of the indistinguishable selective-file chosen keyword attack (IND-sF-CKA) and the indistinguishable selective-file keyword guessing attack (IND-sF-KGA), which can satisfy the security requirements [4].

Junggab Son and Juyoung Park describes Long-term electrocardiogram (ECG) monitoring, as a representative application of cyber-physical systems, facilitates the early detection of arrhythmia. Here they proposes an intelligent heart monitoring system, which involves a patient-worn ECG sensor and a remote monitoring station, as well as a decision support server that interconnects these components. The decision support server analyzes the heart activity, using the Pan-Tompkins algorithm to detect heartbeats and a decision tree to classify them. The system protects sensing data and user privacy, which is an essential attribute of dependability, by adopting signal scrambling and anonymous identity schemes. They also employ a public key cryptosystem to enable secure communication between the entities [5].

Author Marva BOUMAIZ et al. intends to investigate the impact of an adjacent BAN's existence, when it transmits power differs, on a reference BAN's output through simulation. Both the CM3A path loss model, defined in the IEEE 802.15.6 standard for the 2.4 GHz on-body medium, and the temporal variation phenomenon, are being considered. Evaluation of output is performed in terms of the rate of packet loss (PLR) [6]. The author Saiyma Fatima Raza et al. suggests a new approach to data protection especially during emergencies in a wireless network

WBAN uses passive Encryption Standard-128 (AES-128) cipher requiring considerable time for encryption which can be fatal in emergencies. Due to the region and resource constraints, the sensor node protection mechanism should be lightweight. The suggested approach uses chaos-based scrambling in emergencies, which is Lightweight concerning AES, and much less processing time is needed in emergencies [7]. Many security standards are inevitable in WBAN, such as data confidentiality, data quality, data accessibility, data authentication, accessibility, access control, transparency, non-repudiation, etc. [8]. Two security suits are presented in the proposed study in the study of Agha et al. [9]. The first security suit focused on KBS key management with Hashing and the second called KAISC suit for communication between sensors as key management scheme.

The requirement to have two separate procedures, one for transmission of data to the base station and one for intersensory communication, is to improve safety. WBAN is an advanced technology that employed nano sensors into the human body and accumulates health-related data. The transportation of data needs security schemes to avoid attackers. Such cryptographic mechanisms are based on the use of well-managed cryptographic keys (generation and distribution) to make security robust enough [11]. The author Marko Kompara et al. used efficient mutual authentication and key agreement technique for security in the proposed study of WBAN [12]. Two new protocols have been proposed by author Peyman Dodangh to exchange the key between the sensor nodes with the watch and the mobile node in a two-tier WBAN topology and to achieve mutual authentication. The proposed protocols for inter and intra BAN sections require secure authentication of other nodes by one node, biosensors, the watch, the mobile node, and the medical server.

Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA) is the most appropriate for WBAN settings where the devices used (sensors and mobile devices) have limited memory space and low processing power is very low compared to traditional

algorithms for encryption [19]. The scheme adopts the concept of hybrid encryption to reduce data encryption's computational overhead, that is, to use the symmetric key to encrypt data to ensure performance, and to use the CP-ABE method to encrypt the symmetric key for protection. [20]

III SYSTEM OVERVIEW

A typical system model [3] of the proposed WBAN system is depicted in Fig. 1. The four most important entities of the WBAN system are trusted authority (TA), Sensors (wearable and implanted), data sink (a mobile device like a smart phone or the BAN data controller), and users such as doctors, medical experts and patients

Trusted authority (TA):

The TA is used to do system initialization, public parameters generation, user registration and secret keys generation for every user. The generated secret keys should be unique in nature to avoid collusion attacks. At first, all users are required to register in the TA through its website by providing the necessary information, which includes personal information, original identities and so on. A secure socket layer (SSL) encryption is performed between user and TA during the registration process. After completion of the registration process, TA issues credentials to the users. By getting the credentials from TA only, the users are considered as the WBAN users.

Sensors:

Generally, a WBAN consists of wireless wearable and implanted sensors. The wearable sensors are equipped on/near the surface human body through wearable devices and the implanted sensors are implanted inside the tissue of the human body. These sensors are mainly used to provide life support by monitoring vital biological body parameters such as blood pressure, body temperature and so on. The main resource constraint of the implanted sensors is battery power compared to wearable sensors. Since the wearable devices are commonly battery-powered, the batteries can be easily changed and recharged. These wearable and implanted sensors collect the information about the biological parameters of the human body and send it to the data sink. In turn, the data sink of the particular patient sends the biological information to an authorized medical expert or an authorized doctor periodically.

Data Sink:

A data sink is a mobile device such as a smartphone or a BAN controller which is used to collect the patient's biological information from the implanted and wearable sensors. The data

sink has communication and computation capabilities to send the biological information to the authorized doctors. The data sink has the storage capability to store the collected biological information and to store the secret keys which are given by TA during the time of user's initial registration process. The data sink can authenticate the medical experts or doctors in an anonymous manner to understand their legitimacy with TA before sending the biological information to them. On the other hand, protecting the information in the data sink is also essential to avoid various categories of security attacks in WBANs. In order to overcome this limitation, in our framework, the information is stored in an encrypted manner and hence the attacker has no way to access the original information. Therefore, the main functionality of the data sink is to keep the information in an encrypted form and to disseminate the information to the authorized doctors or medical experts also in an encrypted form. Thus, the information kept in the data sink is protected and it is not easily compromised by attackers.

Users:

The authorized patients, doctors or other medical experts are considered as the users in the WBAN system. TA can generate a set of unique secret keys for every registered user. These keys are used to anonymously authenticate the sender of the patient-related information and to avoid the malicious injection of information from the outside.




Fig 1 System Architecture
IV PROPOSED SCHEMES

In this section, propose a computationally efficient anonymous authentication scheme based on bilinear pairing to avoid communication with malicious users in the WBAN system. In anonymous authentication, the patients can effectively authenticate the doctors without knowing their actual credentials or identity information. Hence, the privacy of the doctor is preserved from information leakage. In the same manner, doctors can anonymously authenticate the patients to

avoid communication with the malicious patients. To achieve perfect anonymous authentication, the user's real credentials and secret keys must be protected. Our scheme has six important stages namely TA's initialization, user registration, patient's anonymous authentication process, doctor's anonymous authentication process, confidentiality and revocation.

A) Initialization:

TA picks the random numbers $t \in \mathbb{Z}^* q$ as its master key and $a \in \mathbb{Z}^* q$ as its private key. Then, TA computes its public key as $X_1 = g^{a+1}$ and an authentication parameter as $A_1 = g^{1+2^{a+t+1}}$.

B) User Registration

In the registration process, the WBAN users (patient or doctor or other medical expert) directly access the TA's website and provides their personal details like name, address, mobile number and email id, etc.

1). If the user is the patient P_i , then TA gets the personal details from P_i and stores them in its database in a secure manner. Next, TA picks a random number $u_i \in \mathbb{Z}^* q$ and computes the private key as $P_r P_i = g^{1+u_i+a}$.

2) Then, TA generates an anonymous identity for each P_i such that $FP_i = g^{a+t-u_i+1}$ to protect the real identity of P_i from unauthorized users during the time of communications. Instead of using the real credentials of P_i , the anonymous identity FP_i is used for communications in WBANs. Here, FP_i is mapped with the user's real credentials only in TA. Therefore, by capturing this anonymous identity, it will give zero knowledge about the real credentials of P_i to attackers.

3) Besides, TA generates the tracking parameter TP_i such that $TP_i = g^{t+u_i+1}$ for each P_i and keeps $(P_k P_i, P_r P_i, FP_i, TA P_i)$ in its tracking list. In case of patient's misbehaviour, TA can revoke him/her from the WBANs using TP_i .

4) Then, TA sends $P_r P_i$ through SSL to P_i and P_i stores $P_r P_i$ in its data sink in a secure manner. Finally, TA sends $\Omega = ((FP_i, k P_k P_i, k TP_i) \oplus P_r P_i)$ to P_i . By receiving this, P_i performs $\Omega \oplus P_r P_i$ and gets $(FP_i, P_k P_i, TP_i)$.

5) Similarly, for a D_i , TA picks a random number $d_i \in \mathbb{Z}^* q$ and computes the private key as $P_r D_i = g^{1+d_i+a+1}$ and its corresponding public key as $P_k D_i = g^{d_i+1}$.

6) Then, TA computes an anonymous identity FD_i such that $FD_i = g^{a+d_i+1}$ for D_i .

7) Moreover, the doctors are required to register their working medical institution in the TA. Then, TA generates an anonymous identity for the working institution of D_i such that $F_{Mi} = g^{a-d_i+t+1}$. Next, TA can generate this identity only if the corresponding medical institution is registered in the TA. The

doctors of the non-registered institutions are not considered to be the part of the WBAN system. Hence, the medical institution is also anonymously authenticated by the patient.

8) For each D_i , T A generates a tracking parameter $TD_i = g^{t+di}$ and keeps $(FD_i, F_{Mi}, T a D_i)$ in its tracking list to revoke the misbehaving doctors from the WBANs.

9) In addition, T A selects two secret keys (DSK) $K_{i1}, K_{i2} \in Z^*$ for a doctor D_i , where $K_{i1}, K_{i2} > 18000$.

10) Next, T A sends $P r D_i$ through SSL to D_i and the D_i stores $P r D_i$ in a secure manner. Finally, T A sends $\Omega_0 = ((F_{Di} || P k_{Di} || F_{Mi} || K_{i1} || K_{i2}) \oplus P r D_i)$ to the D_i . By receiving this, the D_i performs $\Omega_0 \oplus P r D_i$ and gets $(FD_i, P k_{Di}, F_{Mi}, K_{i1}, K_{i2})$.

After the completion of registration process, a patient and a doctor can perform anonymous authentication process.

C) Patient's Anonymous Authentication Process

In anonymous mutual authentication process, the patients and doctors are required to anonymously authenticate each other before starting their communications. In patient's anonymous authentication process, the credentials of the patients are verified anonymously by the doctors or the medical experts.

Anonymous authentication certificate generation To prove the legitimacy to the doctors or medical experts anonymously, the patient's data sink first generates the anonymous authentication certificate (AAC) as per the following steps:

Anonymous signature generation:

To maintain the integrity of the communication messages, the data sink is required to generate the anonymous signature.

Anonymous signature verification:

By receiving $\{AS_k, \delta_1\}$, D_i first verifies the integrity of m by checking whether $e(\delta_1 \times g^b, AS) = e(g_1, g_2)$. If this condition is satisfied, then D_i accepts m , otherwise rejects it.

$$\begin{aligned} e(\delta_1 \times g_1^b, AS) &= e(g_1^k \times g_1^b, g_2^{\frac{1}{k+b}}) \\ &= e(g_1^{k+b}, g_2^{\frac{1}{k+b}}) = e(g_1, g_2) \end{aligned}$$

Anonymous authentication certificate verification:

Next, D_i checks the timestamp T_{Si} such that $|T_{sj} - T_{Si}| < \Delta T$ to avoid the replay attack where ΔT is the mutually agreed time delay between the D_i and P_i .

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma'_1 &= \delta_1 \times \mathcal{O}_1 \times \mathcal{O}_2 \\ &= g_1^k \times g_1^{l+\beta} \times g_1^{-l} \\ &= g_1^{k+l+\beta-l} \\ &= g_1^{k+\beta} = \gamma_1 \\ \gamma'_2 &= \mathcal{O}_2 \times \mathcal{O}_3 \times \mathcal{O}_4 \\ &= g_1^{-l} \times g_1^{-\beta+l} \times g_1^{\alpha+l} \\ &= g_1^{-l-\beta+l+\alpha+l} \\ &= g_1^{-\beta+\alpha+l} = \gamma_2 \end{aligned}$$

After verifying the anonymous signature and anonymous authentication certificate only the doctor D_i can analyze the biological information (BI). If any one of the verification processes fails, then P_i is considered as the illegal user of WBAN system.

D) Doctor's Anonymous Authentication Process

Before sending the biological information and getting the medical advises or instructions from the doctor, it is necessary for the patient to check the legitimacy of the doctors or medical experts in an anonymous manner.

Doctor's anonymous authentication certificate generation:

D_i generates his authentication certificate DAAC as follows:

- D_i computes an arbitrary parameter θ_1 as $\theta_1 = F_{Mi} \times F_{Di}$.
- After computing θ_1 , D_i computes a challenger value (DCV) as $DCV = H(e(g_1, g_2)kF_{Di} kP k_{Di})$.
- Then, D_i sets its anonymous certificate as $DAAC = \{\theta_1, F_{Di}, P k_{Di}\}$ and sends it to the data sink of P_i along with the timestamp $T_{Si}+1$.
- By receiving this, P_i first verifies the current timestamp and then verifies whether $e(\theta_1, A_1) = e(g_1, g_2)$ to check the legitimacy of D_i .

$$\begin{aligned} h_1 &= e(\theta_1, A_1) \\ &= e(F_{Mi} \times F_{Di}, A_1) \\ &= e(g_1^{a-d_i+t} \times g_1^{a+d_i}, g_2^{\frac{1}{2a+t}}) \\ &= e(g_1^{a-d_i+t+a+d_i}, g_2^{\frac{1}{2a+t}}) \\ &= e(g_1^{2a+t}, g_2^{\frac{1}{2a+t}}) = e(g_1, g_2) \end{aligned}$$

- Then, the data sink calculates its own challenger value as $DCV_0 = H(h_1 k F_{Di} k P k_{Di})$ and compares whether $DCV_0 = DCV$. If these two values are equal, then the data sink considers that D_i is an authenticated user of WBAN, otherwise, it simply avoids the future communications with D_i .

During the anonymous authentication process as well as the communication of messages, the doctor does not know about the real location of the patient. The real location of the patient is preserved from the other entities of WBAN by the TA. However, in the case of emergency, the doctor is required to monitor the patient directly. In the case, the doctor can only get the location of the patient from T A using CRT-based location privacy preservation process.

E) Confidentiality

After successful mutual authentication, the data sink of P_i sends the biological information (BI) to D_i . To maintain confidentiality, the BI of P_i is encrypted by the data sink using any one of the Improved AES Encryption algorithms.

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 \oplus H(e(Pr_{D_i}, C_2)) \\ = (Y \parallel BI \parallel Pk_{P_i} \parallel T_{P_i}) \\ \oplus H(e(g_1, g_1)^{r_i}) \oplus H(e(Pr_{D_i}, C_2)) \end{aligned}$$

Where

$$\begin{aligned} H(e(Pr_{D_i}, C_2)) \\ = H(e(g_1^{\frac{1}{d_i+a}}, (Pk_{D_i} \times X_1)^{r_i})) \\ = H(e(g_1^{\frac{1}{d_i+a}}, (g_1^{d_i} \times g_1^a)^{r_i})) \\ = H(e(g_1^{\frac{1}{d_i+a}}, (g_1^{d_i+a})^{r_i})) \\ = H(e(g_1, (g_1)^{r_i})) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 \oplus H(e(Pr_{D_i}, C_2)) \\ = (Y \parallel BI \parallel Pk_{P_i} \parallel T_{P_i}) \oplus \\ H(e(g_1, g_1)^{r_i}) \oplus H(e(g_1, g_1)^{r_i}) \\ = (Y \parallel BI \parallel Pk_{P_i} \parallel T_{P_i}) \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, D_i sends his medical advice (MA) to P_i in an encrypted manner as follows:

(F) Revocation

Sometimes, even the authenticated doctors may give wrong medical advice or improper medical treatments to the patients so that they may suffer from harmful side effects. In case of such misbehavior, T A can revoke the misbehaving doctors from the WBAN system. For that, T A first decrypts the ciphertext C_0 of D_i using the private key of P_i who is affected by D_i 's wrong medical advice. Then, TA computes $T_a D_i$ and matches this parameter with the original identity of D_i through its tracking list. After identifying D_i , TA revokes her/him from the WBAN system and hence the patients cannot make further communications with D_i .

V RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The following metrics are used to evaluate the performance of the protocols:

Computation Cost

In proposed scheme, the multiplicative cyclic groups G_1 , G_2 and G_T are generated based on a Type-A elliptic curve, which is defined in the PBC library with default parameters. Let us consider some major cryptographic operations to determine the computation cost as follows: T_p , T_h , T_s and T_m denote the time required to perform the bilinear operation, hash operation, symmetric and point multiplication operation in a group, respectively. The experiment is performed on a intel core i3 2-GHz processor featured with 4-GB RAM, running with C#.net. The execution time for each time parameter T_p , T_h , T_s and T_m are derived after repeated simulations and the average of all simulation results is taken as final values. The execution times of each cryptographic operations T_p , T_h , T_s and T_m are calculated to be equal to 1.7 ms, 2.6 ms, 0.4 ms and 0.7 ms, respectively.

Fig. 5.1 shows the comparison of computational cost of patient's anonymous authentication with various schemes. From Fig. 5.1, it is very clear to observe that our scheme takes only around 550 ms for verifying 100 patients where as the other existing schemes take more than 1500 ms for verifying 100 patients.

Comparison Table of Computation cost of certificate and signature verification

No. of Patients	Verification time in ms		
	AA	AAC+ECC	AAC+IAES
20	400	150	145
40	750	300	290
60	1200	450	440
80	1500	550	530
100	2000	700	680




Figure 2 Computation cost of certificate and signature verification

Communication overhead

In this section, the communicational overhead of our scheme is analyzed with the existing schemes. The Type-A elliptic curve $y^2 \bmod q \equiv x^3 + ax + b \bmod q$, which is defined in the PBC library is used, where q is the 160-bit prime number and the size of each term in G_1 , G_2 and GT are 20 bytes. Let us consider the size of the timestamp, element in $Z^* \bmod q$ and the output of hash function are 4 bytes, 20 bytes and 20 bytes, respectively.

Comparison Table of Communication Overhead

Message Type	Communication Overhead		
	AA	AAC+ECC	AAC+IAES
Single message (bytes)	320	180	170
n messages (bytes)- =2	640	360	350




Figure 3 Communication Overhead

V1 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this project, proposed a new AA scheme with IAES for WBANs with provable security. In our scheme, first the doctor anonymously authenticate the patient to check the patient's legitimacy and then the patient anonymously authenticate the

doctor to check the legitimacy of the doctor. Moreover, the location privacy of both the patient and the doctor is preserved by T A and it is exposed to the authorized doctors or patients based on the use of CRT. The security analysis shows that our scheme can provide resistance against impersonation attack, message modification attack, replay attack, eavesdropping attack and man-in-the-middle attack. The performance analysis shows that our scheme is efficient in terms of computational cost and hence it is more appropriate for practical IoT-based WBAN applications. The future extension of this work is to provide the batch authentication to the communicating users in an efficient manner. In future work, key management schemes designed for WSN are inefficient and unnecessarily complex when applied to WBAN. Considering the key management issue, WBAN are also different from WPAN because WBAN can use random biometric measurements as keys

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