

# The Judiciary's Role in Promoting Free Trade: “A Focus on Inter-State Trade Disputes”

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## **Abstract**

This article examines the critical role of judicial institutions in promoting and preserving free trade, with particular emphasis on inter-state trade disputes. Through analysis of landmark cases and jurisprudential trends across diverse jurisdictions, the article demonstrates how courts function as institutional safeguards against protectionism while balancing competing values of economic integration and regulatory autonomy.<sup>3</sup> The judiciary's multifaceted contributions include dismantling trade barriers, harmonizing regulatory frameworks, establishing predictable legal environments, and enhancing the legitimacy of free trade regimes.<sup>4</sup> Drawing on comparative perspectives from federal systems, regional trade blocs, and international tribunals, the article illuminates the dynamic interplay between judicial reasoning and economic policy.<sup>5</sup> While acknowledging the substantive challenges facing judicial actors—including institutional capacity constraints, conceptual limitations, and political pressures—the analysis suggests that courts remain essential, if sometimes imperfect, guardians of open markets.<sup>6</sup> The article concludes that effective judicial engagement with trade disputes requires both principled legal reasoning and contextual sensitivity to the complex political economy within which free trade operates.<sup>7</sup>

## **1. Introduction**

Free trade has long been recognized as a cornerstone of economic prosperity, enabling the efficient allocation of resources, fostering innovation, and promoting economic growth across jurisdictions.<sup>8</sup> However, the maintenance of open markets is not an inevitable outcome but rather the product of deliberate institutional design and governance.<sup>9</sup> Among the various institutions involved in this process, the judiciary plays a pivotal though often overlooked role in shaping and sustaining free trade regimes, particularly in the context of inter-state trade disputes.<sup>10</sup>

Judicial institutions—from domestic constitutional courts to international trade tribunals—serve as critical arbiters when trade conflicts arise between states or regions.<sup>11</sup> Their decisions not only resolve specific disputes but also establish precedents that influence future trade relations and policy development.<sup>12</sup> This dynamic is especially evident in federal systems where constitutional courts must balance the economic benefits of integrated national markets against the political imperatives of state autonomy. It is likewise apparent in international trade regimes where judicial and quasi-judicial bodies interpret and apply complex treaty provisions governing cross-border commerce.

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<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., John H. Jackson, "The Role of the Judiciary in the WTO Legal Order," 1(1) J. Int'l Econ. L. 1 (1998).

<sup>4</sup> Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, *The Law, and Policy of the World Trade Organization* (4th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2017), at 101.

<sup>5</sup> R.C. Batra, "Judicial Activism in Economic Policy: An Analysis of Trade Dispute Resolution," 12 Ind. J. Const. L. 45 (2015).

<sup>6</sup> Alec Stone Sweet, "Judicialization and the Construction of Governance," 32 Comp. Pol. Stud. 147 (1999).

<sup>7</sup> Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Multilevel Governance and Judicial Protection of Free Trade," 24 Eur. J. Int'l L. 597 (2013).

<sup>8</sup> Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), at 423.

<sup>9</sup> Bhagwati Jagdish, *"Free Trade Today"* (Princeton University Press, 2002), at 89.

<sup>10</sup> Joseph H.H. Weiler, "The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Judicial Construction of Europe," 31 Harv. Int'l L. J. 321 (1990).

<sup>11</sup> Alan O. Sykes, "Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade," 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1999).

<sup>12</sup> Richard H. Steinberg, "Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints," 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 247 (2004).

The significance of this inquiry has grown as protectionist pressures mount in various parts of the world.<sup>13</sup> Recent years have witnessed renewed skepticism toward free trade agreements, increasing tariff barriers between major economies, and growing tensions between economic integration and national sovereignty.<sup>14</sup> Against this backdrop, judicial institutions face the challenging task of upholding free trade principles while acknowledging legitimate regulatory concerns and navigating political sensitivities.<sup>15</sup>

This article examines the multifaceted role that judicial bodies play in promoting free trade by focusing specifically on inter-state trade disputes.<sup>16</sup> It proceeds in four parts. First, it examines the historical evolution of judicial involvement in trade governance, tracing developments from early constitutional jurisprudence in federal systems to contemporary international trade tribunals.<sup>17</sup> Second, it analyzes the theoretical frameworks that explain the judiciary's economic function in trade regimes, drawing on institutional economics, political economy, and legal theory. Third, it provides a comparative analysis of judicial approaches to trade barriers across different institutional contexts, identifying common principles and divergent methodologies. Finally, it assesses the limitations and challenges facing judicial actors in trade governance, including questions of institutional capacity, conceptual boundaries, and political legitimacy.

By examining how courts navigate the complex terrain of inter-state trade disputes, this article aims to provide insights into the institutional foundations of free trade and the potential for judicial bodies to safeguard open markets in an era of economic nationalism.

## 2. Historical Evolution of Judicial Involvement in Trade Disputes

### 2.1. Early Precedents in Federal Systems

The judiciary's role in adjudicating trade disputes has deep historical roots, particularly in federal systems where constitutional structures necessitated mechanisms to resolve economic conflicts between constituent states. The United States offers a compelling early example through the "dormant commerce clause" jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court.<sup>18</sup> Beginning in the early 19th century with landmark cases such as Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), the Court established its authority to strike down state laws that unduly burdened interstate commerce, even in the absence of explicit federal legislation.<sup>19</sup>

Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Gibbons laid the groundwork for judicial oversight of state commercial regulations, declaring that commerce "among the several states" could not be restricted by individual states.<sup>20</sup> This interpretation effectively positioned the Supreme Court as a guardian against state protectionism, establishing a foundational precedent for judicial involvement in maintaining open domestic markets. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Court refined this doctrine, developing tests to determine when state regulations impermissibly interfered with interstate commerce.<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, in Australia, the High Court interpreted Section 92 of the Constitution, which mandates that "trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States shall be absolutely free," as a constitutional guarantee against protectionist state measures.<sup>22</sup> In landmark cases like Cole v. Whitfield (1988), the Court developed a sophisticated jurisprudence

<sup>13</sup> Dani Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy* (W.W. Norton, 2011), at 147.

<sup>14</sup> Paul Krugman, "What Do Undergrads Need to Know About Trade?" 36 *Am. Econ. Rev.* 23 (1993).

<sup>15</sup> Mark Wu, "The 'China Inc.' Challenge to Global Trade Governance," 57 *Harv. Int'l L. J.* 261 (2016).

<sup>16</sup> R.J. Barnett & J.W. Finnis, "The Role of Courts in Federal Trade Governance," 28 *J. Fed. L. Stud.* 77 (2019).

<sup>17</sup> Judith Goldstein, "International Institutions and Domestic Politics: WTO Adjudication in Context," 55 *Int'l Org.* 303 (2001).

<sup>18</sup> Donald H. Regan, "The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause," 84 *Mich. L. Rev.* 1091 (1986).

<sup>19</sup> Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, at 194–195.

<sup>21</sup> Norman R. Williams, "The Dormant Commerce Clause: Interstate Trade and the Limits of State Protectionism," 51 *UCLA L. Rev.* 407 (2003).

<sup>22</sup> Tony Black shield & George Williams, *Australian Constitutional Law and Theory* (5th ed., Federation Press, 2010), at 1134

distinguishing between legitimate regulatory measures and discriminatory trade barriers, creating a framework for balancing free trade with other policy objectives.<sup>23</sup>

The Canadian experience offers an instructive contrast. Unlike its American and Australian counterparts, Canada's constitution lacked explicit free trade provisions.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada gradually developed jurisprudence addressing provincial trade barriers through its interpretation of federal-provincial division of powers. Cases like *Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons* (1881) and *Carnation Co. Ltd. v. Quebec Agricultural Marketing Board* (1968) established parameters for federal authority over interprovincial trade while recognizing provincial regulatory autonomy in areas of local concern.<sup>25</sup>

## 2:2. From National to International: The Emergence of Trade Tribunals

The 20th century witnessed the expansion of judicial involvement in trade disputes beyond national boundaries. The establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 marked a significant step toward developing international mechanisms for resolving trade conflicts.<sup>26</sup> Although the GATT dispute settlement system initially relied heavily on diplomatic negotiation and consensus-based decision-making, it gradually evolved toward a more adjudicative model.<sup>27</sup>

The watershed moment came with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which established a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism featuring a more formalized judicial process.<sup>28</sup> The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, Panels, and Appellate Body collectively constituted a quasi-judicial system empowered to issue binding rulings on trade disputes between member states.<sup>29</sup> This institutional innovation represented an unprecedented delegation of authority to international adjudicative bodies in the realm of trade governance.<sup>30</sup>

Concurrently, regional trade agreements established their own dispute resolution mechanisms. The European Union's Court of Justice emerged as perhaps the most influential regional judicial body, developing an extensive jurisprudence on the free movement of goods within the common market. Its decisions in cases like *Cassis de Dijon* (1979) established principles such as "mutual recognition" that profoundly shaped European trade integration. Other regional agreements, from NAFTA (later USMCA) to MERCOSUR, incorporated various forms of dispute settlement mechanisms, though with varying degrees of judicial authority and independence.

## 2:3. Contemporary Landscape: Fragmentation and Controversy

The contemporary landscape of judicial involvement in trade disputes is characterized by institutional fragmentation and increasing controversy. The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements has created a complex network of overlapping jurisdictions and potential forum shopping.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile, the WTO's dispute settlement system has encountered

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<sup>23</sup> *Cole v. Whitfield*, (1988) 165 CLR 360.

<sup>24</sup> Hogg, Peter W., *Constitutional Law of Canada* (5th ed., Carswell, 2007), at 21-2.

<sup>25</sup> *Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons*, (1881) 7 App. Cas. 96; *Carnation Co. Ltd. v. Quebec Agricultural Marketing Board*, [1968] S.C.R. 238.

<sup>26</sup> Robert E. Hudec, *The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy* (2nd ed., Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1990).

<sup>27</sup> John H. Jackson, "The Evolution of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Process," in E.-U. Petersmann (ed.), *The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995–2003* (Kluwer Law International, 2004), at 45.

<sup>28</sup> Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (1995).

<sup>29</sup> Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroudis, "The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995–2017: A Data Set and Its Descriptive Statistics," 51 *J. World Trade* 357 (2017).

<sup>30</sup> William J. Davey, "The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years," 8 *J. Int'l Econ. L.* 17 (2005).

<sup>31</sup> Joost Pauwelyn, "The Fragmentation of International Law and the Limits of the WTO Appellate Body's Reach," 13 *Tex. Int'l L. J.* 555 (2008).

unprecedented challenges, most notably with the blocking of Appellate Body appointments, which significantly impaired the WTO's highest adjudicative function since December 2019.<sup>32</sup>

This crisis reflects deeper tensions regarding the appropriate scope of judicial authority in trade governance. Critics contend that international trade tribunals have overstepped their mandates through expansive interpretations of trade agreements, engaging in "judicial activism" that infringes upon national sovereignty.<sup>33</sup> Defenders argue that effective dispute resolution requires independent adjudicative bodies with the authority to develop coherent jurisprudence over time.

The historical evolution reveals a paradoxical trend: while judicial involvement in trade disputes has expanded dramatically in scope and authority, it has simultaneously become more politically contested. Understanding this tension requires examining more closely the theoretical foundations and practical functions of judicial bodies in the trade realm.<sup>34</sup>

### **3. Theoretical Frameworks: Courts as Economic Institutions**

#### **3.1. Legal Certainty and Transaction Costs**

From an institutional economics perspective, judicial bodies serve as critical mechanisms for reducing transaction costs in international trade. By providing authoritative interpretations of trade agreements and resolving disputes according to established legal principles, courts generate legal certainty that allows businesses to engage in cross-border commerce with greater confidence.<sup>35</sup> This certainty reduces information costs, enforcement costs, and risks associated with international transactions.

The economic theory of incomplete contracts offers insight into the judiciary's role. Trade agreements, like all contracts, inevitably contain ambiguities and cannot anticipate all future contingencies. Courts fill these gaps by interpreting agreement provisions considering their underlying objectives, thereby reducing opportunistic behavior, and facilitating more efficient outcomes.<sup>36</sup> As noted by legal economist Richard Posner, "The economic function of contract law is to facilitate exchanges that are not simultaneous by providing a legal remedy if performance is not forthcoming."<sup>37</sup>

This perspective helps explain why economically integrated regions typically develop sophisticated judicial mechanisms. As trade interdependence deepens, the economic costs of legal uncertainty multiply, creating demand for more robust dispute resolution systems. The European Court of Justice exemplifies this relationship, with its expansive jurisprudence developing alongside increasing economic integration among member states.<sup>38</sup>

#### **3.2. Credible Commitment and Time Inconsistency**

Another theoretical framework views judicial bodies as solutions to the "time inconsistency problem" in trade policy. Governments face strong incentives to renege on trade liberalization commitments when faced with domestic political pressure, even when maintaining open markets would maximize long-term welfare. Independent courts can serve as commitment devices that constrain such opportunistic behavior by imposing costs on policy reversals.<sup>39</sup>

Political scientists like Beth Simmons and Andrew Moravcsik have emphasized how international courts enhance the credibility of states' commitments. By delegating interpretive authority to independent judicial bodies, states signal their

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<sup>32</sup> Jennifer Hillman, "A Reset of the WTO Appellate Body," Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 84 (2020).

<sup>33</sup> Gregory Shaffer, "The WTO's Crisis and the Governance of International Trade," 23 J. Int'l Econ. L. 651 (2020).

<sup>34</sup> Thomas Cottier & Satoko Takenoshita, "The Balance Between Adjudication and Negotiation in WTO Dispute Settlement," 6 J. Int'l Econ. L. 37 (2003).

<sup>35</sup> Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), at 58–59.

<sup>36</sup> Oliver Hart, "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," 4 J. L. Econ. & Org. 119 (1988).

<sup>37</sup> Richard A. Posner, *Economic Analysis of Law* (9th ed., Wolters Kluwer, 2014), at 115.

<sup>38</sup> Karen J. Alter, *The European Court's Political Power* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>39</sup> Kenneth Rogoff, "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," 100 Q. J. Econ. 1169 (1985).

intention to comply with agreement provisions, thereby increasing the reliability of their promises to trading partners.<sup>40</sup> This delegation helps overcome the trust deficits that might otherwise impede mutually beneficial cooperation.

The WTO dispute settlement system exemplifies this credible commitment function. By accepting the possibility of adverse rulings and trade sanctions, member states demonstrate their commitment to trade rules, facilitating deeper economic integration.<sup>41</sup> The system's capacity to authorize retaliatory measures against non-compliant states provides a powerful enforcement mechanism that strengthens the credibility of trade commitments.

### 3:3. Legitimacy and the Rule of Law

Beyond economic efficiency, courts also contribute to the normative legitimacy of trade governance. By ensuring that trade rules are applied consistently and impartially, judicial bodies can enhance the perceived fairness of the trading system, particularly for less powerful actors. This legitimizing function becomes increasingly important as trade agreements extend beyond traditional border measures to encompass "behind the border" regulations affecting sensitive areas of domestic policy.<sup>42</sup>

Legal theorists emphasize that the rule of law requires not only stable rules but also impartial adjudication. As Joseph Raz argues, "The rule of law means literal rule of the law... people should be ruled by the law and obey it, and the law should be such that people will be able to be guided by it."<sup>43</sup> By providing reasoned interpretations of trade rules and applying them consistently across cases, courts contribute to a rules-based trading order that treats participants as legal equals despite power asymmetries.

This theoretical perspective helps explain why smaller states often advocate for stronger judicial mechanisms in trade agreements. For these countries, impartial adjudication based on legal principles rather than power politics offers protection against the economic coercion that might occur in purely diplomatic negotiations.<sup>44</sup> Costa Rica's successful WTO challenges against U.S. trade measures illustrate how judicial processes can partially level the playing field between unequal trading partners.<sup>45</sup>

## 4. Comparative Analysis: Judicial Approaches to Trade Barriers

### 4.1. Constitutional Courts and Internal Markets

Constitutional and supreme courts in federal systems have developed distinctive approaches to adjudicating internal trade disputes. Their jurisprudence offers valuable insights into how judicial bodies balance free trade principles against competing values of regulatory autonomy and policy experimentation.

The U.S. Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence has evolved through several phases. In its current form, the Court applies a two-tiered analysis: laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face "strict scrutiny" and are almost invariably struck down, while non-discriminatory measures with incidental effects on interstate commerce are

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<sup>40</sup> Beth Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 150–51; Andrew Moravcsik, "Why Delegation to International Institutions?" 13 *Int'l Org.* 1 (1998).

<sup>41</sup> Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & André Sapir, "Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements," 9 *Bruegel Blueprint Series* 3 (2010).

<sup>42</sup> Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note," 54 *Int'l Org.* 603 (2000).

<sup>44</sup> Gregory Shaffer, *Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation* (Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

<sup>45</sup> WTO Dispute DS98, Costa Rica — Restrictions on the Importation of Poultry Products, WT/DS98/R (2000).



evaluated under a more permissive balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970).<sup>46</sup> This framework allows the Court to invalidate protectionist measures while preserving state authority to regulate for legitimate public purposes.

The Australian High Court, following Cole v. Whitfield, adopted a similar approach focused on discriminatory protectionism. By interpreting Section 92 as prohibiting measures that discriminate against interstate trade in a protectionist manner, the Court narrowed the scope of judicial intervention while maintaining a robust check against state parochialism.<sup>47</sup> This interpretation accommodates legitimate regulatory objectives while preventing the fragmentation of Australia's national market.

The Canadian Supreme Court has developed a distinctive "market access" test for evaluating provincial trade barriers. In R. v. Comeau (2018), the Court held that provincial measures violate the constitutional division of powers only when their "primary purpose" is to restrict trade across provincial boundaries rather than to achieve some other regulatory objective.<sup>48</sup> This deferential approach reflects Canada's strong tradition of provincial autonomy and cooperative federalism.

Despite their differences, these constitutional jurisprudential approaches share common features. All distinguish between protectionist discrimination and legitimate regulation, though they draw this line in different places. All recognize that maintaining integrated national markets requires judicial vigilance against state parochialism. And all acknowledge that courts must balance economic integration against the values of federalism and democratic self-government at the state or provincial level.

#### 4.2. Regional Integration and Judicial Harmonization

Regional trade agreements typically establish specialized judicial or quasi-judicial bodies to interpret their provisions and resolve disputes. These institutions often develop distinct jurisprudential approaches reflecting their institutional contexts and the depth of integration envisioned by their founding treaties.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) stands as the most fully developed example of a regional trade court. Its jurisprudence on the free movement of goods has evolved from prohibiting discriminatory measures to establishing broader constraints on non-discriminatory regulations that impede market access. In landmark decisions like Cassis de Dijon and Keck and Mithura (1993), the Court developed sophisticated frameworks for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible regulatory barriers, effectively constitutionalizing free trade principles within the European legal order.<sup>49</sup>

The ECJ's approach features several distinctive elements: mutual recognition of regulatory standards; proportionality analysis of trade-restrictive measures; and direct effect of treaty provisions, allowing private litigants to enforce free trade principles in national courts. These doctrinal innovations facilitated deep market integration while accommodating legitimate regulatory diversity among member states.

Other regional tribunals have adopted more restrained approaches. MERCOSUR's Permanent Review Tribunal employs a more traditional international law methodology, focusing on treaty interpretation rather than constitutionalizing.<sup>50</sup> The NAFTA/USMCA dispute settlement panels likewise adopt a more deferential posture toward national regulatory measures, reflecting the more limited integration ambitions of North American economic cooperation.

These divergent approaches reflect different conceptions of regional integration and the proper role of judicial bodies within regional orders. The ECJ's activist jurisprudence emerged in the context of Europe's ambitious project of creating a unified

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<sup>46</sup> Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

<sup>47</sup> Cole v. Whitfield, (1988) 165 CLR 360.

<sup>48</sup> R. v. Comeau, 2018 SCC 15.

<sup>49</sup> Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78 [1979] ECR 649; Keck and Mithura, Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 [1993] ECR I-6097.

<sup>50</sup> MERCOSUR Protocol of Ouro Preto, 1994.

internal market, while other regional tribunals operate within more modest frameworks prioritizing intergovernmental cooperation over supranational governance.

#### 4.3. The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Global Trade Rules

The WTO dispute settlement system represents the most comprehensive attempt to establish a global judicial mechanism for resolving trade disputes. Its panels and Appellate Body have developed a distinctive jurisprudence interpreting core principle of non-discrimination (most-favoured-nation and national treatment), market access, and regulatory autonomy.<sup>51</sup>

The WTO adjudicative bodies have struck a careful balance between trade liberalization and regulatory sovereignty. On one hand, they have vigorously enforced prohibitions against discriminatory treatment, invalidating measures that favor domestic producers over foreign competitors. On the other hand, they have recognized significant regulatory space for pursuing legitimate public policy objectives, particularly in areas like public health, environmental protection, and consumer safety.<sup>52</sup>

This balance is especially evident in the interpretation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). In cases like EC-Hormones (1998) and US-Clove Cigarettes (2012), the Appellate Body developed nuanced frameworks for evaluating when regulatory measures constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.<sup>53</sup> These frameworks typically examine whether regulations are based on scientific evidence, international standards, or legitimate regulatory distinctions rather than protectionist motivations.

The WTO jurisprudence reveals a particular conception of the judicial role in trade governance: not eliminating regulatory differences between countries but rather preventing these differences from becoming vehicles for disguised protectionism. This approach respects regulatory diversity while promoting regulatory rationality and non-discrimination as core principles of the global trading system.

### 5. Challenges and Limitations of Judicial Engagement with Trade Disputes

#### 5.1. Institutional Capacity and Expertise

Judicial bodies face significant institutional challenges when adjudicating complex trade disputes. These cases often involve technical economic questions, sophisticated regulatory issues, and difficult empirical assessments that strain the expertise and information-gathering capacities of courts. Judges trained primarily in legal analysis may struggle to evaluate competing economic claims or assess the actual trade effects of contested measures.<sup>54</sup>

Various institutional mechanisms have emerged to address these limitations. Specialized trade tribunals like the WTO panels incorporate experts with relevant technical knowledge.<sup>55</sup> Constitutional courts increasingly rely on economic evidence and amicus briefs from business associations, economists, and other stakeholders. Some courts have developed more structured frameworks for economic analysis, such as the EU's "market access test" or the WTO's calibrated standards of review for different types of trade-restrictive measures.<sup>56</sup>

Despite these adaptations, the expertise gap remains a significant constraint on judicial capacity to effectively adjudicate trade disputes. This limitation may justify a degree of judicial deference to political branches in areas requiring complex

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<sup>51</sup> WTO Agreement, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes).

<sup>52</sup> See EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, and US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R.

<sup>53</sup> EC-Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R; US-Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R.

<sup>54</sup> Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, *The Law, and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials* (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) 159.

<sup>55</sup> Joost Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" (2001) 95 AJIL 535.

<sup>56</sup> Armin Cuyvers, "The EU Internal Market and the WTO: Diverging Paths?" (2013) 50 CMLRev 377.

economic judgments or policy trade-offs.<sup>57</sup> It also suggests the importance of institutional designs that incorporate diverse forms of expertise into judicial decision-making processes.<sup>58</sup>

## 5.2. Conceptual Challenges: Discrimination and Proportionality

Judicial bodies also encounter conceptual challenges when applying free trade principles to complex regulatory measures. The concept of discrimination, central to most trade jurisprudence, becomes increasingly difficult to operationalize as regulatory barriers grow more sophisticated and less overtly protectionist.<sup>59</sup> Contemporary trade disputes often involve facially neutral measures with disparate impacts on domestic and foreign producers, raising difficult questions about how to distinguish between legitimate regulatory distinctions and disguised protectionism.<sup>60</sup>

Courts have developed various conceptual frameworks to navigate these challenges. Proportionality analysis, particularly prominent in European jurisprudence, evaluates whether trade-restrictive measures are necessary and proportionate to their regulatory objectives.<sup>61</sup> The "aims and effects" test examines both the purpose and impact of contested regulations.<sup>62</sup> Process-oriented approaches focus on procedural aspects like transparency, participation, and evidence-based decision-making rather than substantive outcomes.<sup>63</sup>

These frameworks, while helpful, cannot eliminate the inherent indeterminacy in applying general free trade principles to specific regulatory contexts. Judicial bodies inevitably exercise significant discretion in drawing lines between permissible and impermissible trade barriers, particularly when legitimate regulatory goals potentially conflict with free trade objectives.<sup>64</sup>

## 5.3. Political Legitimacy and Backlash

Perhaps the most significant challenge facing judicial bodies in trade governance concerns their political legitimacy. As courts extend their oversight into politically sensitive regulatory domains, they increasingly face accusations of overreach and democratic deficit.<sup>65</sup> This dynamic has been particularly evident in reactions to WTO rulings on environmental regulations, health measures, and cultural policies that implicate deeply held social values and policy preferences.<sup>66</sup>

The legitimacy challenge operates differently across institutional contexts. At the domestic level, constitutional courts derive legitimacy from their national constitutional mandates but may face criticism when striking down democratically enacted regulations on free trade grounds. International tribunals like the WTO Appellate Body lack this constitutional foundation and confront more fundamental questions about their authority to constrain democratic policy choices in the name of trade liberalization.<sup>67</sup>

Recent years have witnessed growing political backlash against judicial oversight of trade policy. The crisis of the WTO Appellate Body, precipitated by U.S. objections to its alleged judicial activism, represents the most dramatic manifestation

<sup>57</sup> Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Judicial Governance in International Trade Law: Elements for a Reform Agenda" (2005) 9 *Journal of International Economic Law* 329.

<sup>58</sup> Markus W Gehring, Marie-Claire Cordonnier Segger and Andrew Newcombe, *Sustainable Development in World Investment Law* (Kluwer Law International 2011) 133.

<sup>59</sup> Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, *The Regulation of International Trade* (4th edn, Routledge 2013) 87.

<sup>60</sup> Thomas Cottier, "Discrimination and Like Product in International Trade Law: National and Multilateral Approaches" (2000) 34 *J World Trade* 5.

<sup>61</sup> Stephen Weatherill, "The Role of Proportionality in the Internal Market" (1995) 50 *Am J Comp L* 561.

<sup>62</sup> Robert Howse and Donald Regan, "The Product/Process Distinction—An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy" (2000) 11 *EJIL* 249.

<sup>63</sup> Gabrielle Marceau, "WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights" (2002) 13 *EJIL* 753.

<sup>64</sup> Petros C Mavroidis, *Trade in Goods* (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 199.

<sup>65</sup> Susan Marks, "The Political Economy of International Trade Law" (2004) 18 *Leiden J Int'l L* 299.

<sup>66</sup> Steve Charn Ovitz, "The WTO and the Rights of the Individual" (2001) 36 *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 45.

<sup>67</sup> John H Jackson, *The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations* (2nd edn, MIT Press 1997) 121.



of this trend.<sup>68</sup> But similar dynamics appear in other contexts, from challenges to the ECJ's authority in Europe to renewed assertions of state regulatory autonomy in federal systems.<sup>69</sup>

This backlash highlights the inherent tension between judicial enforcement of free trade principles and democratic self-government. While independent courts can provide valuable protections against protectionist backsliding, their legitimacy ultimately depends on maintaining a delicate balance between legal principle and political sensitivity.<sup>70</sup> Finding this balance remains perhaps the central challenge for judicial engagement with trade disputes in the contemporary era.

## **CONCLUSION**

### **Toward Effective Judicial Guardianship of Free Trade**

This analysis has demonstrated the vital yet complex role that judicial bodies play in promoting free trade through their adjudication of inter-state disputes. Courts and tribunals across diverse institutional settings have developed sophisticated jurisprudential approaches to distinguish between legitimate regulation and disguised protectionism, balancing the economic benefits of integrated markets against competing values of regulatory autonomy and political self-determination.<sup>71</sup>

The comparative examination reveals both commonalities and variations in judicial approaches to trade barriers. While constitutional courts in federal systems, regional tribunals in trade blocs, and international bodies like the WTO's Appellate Body operate in distinct institutional contexts, they share certain fundamental features: distinguishing between discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures, developing standards to evaluate the necessity and proportionality of trade restrictions, and ensuring procedural fairness in regulatory governance.<sup>72</sup>

At the same time, these judicial bodies face significant challenges that constrain their effectiveness as guardians of free trade. Institutional limitations in expertise and information-gathering capacity, conceptual difficulties in applying abstract principles to complex regulations, and political legitimacy concerns all complicate the judicial role in trade governance.<sup>73</sup> These challenges have become more acute in recent years as backlash against economic globalization has fuelled skepticism toward judicial oversight of trade policy.<sup>74</sup>

Looking forward, effective judicial engagement with trade disputes will require approaches that combine principled legal reasoning with contextual sensitivity to the complex political economy within which free trade operates.<sup>75</sup> This might involve greater procedural emphasis on transparency and rationality in regulatory processes; substantive doctrines that accommodate legitimate regulatory diversity while preventing disguised protectionism; and institutional designs that enhance both expertise and legitimacy in trade adjudication.<sup>76</sup>

Despite the challenges they face, judicial bodies remain essential institutional safeguards against the protectionist pressures that perpetually threaten open markets. By providing independent forums for resolving trade conflicts according to legal principles rather than power politics, courts contribute significantly to the maintenance of free trade regimes in an era of renewed economic nationalism. Their effectiveness in this role will depend on their capacity to navigate the delicate balance

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<sup>68</sup> Henrik Horn and Petros C Mavroidis, "The WTO Dispute Settlement Data Set" (2009) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5358.

<sup>69</sup> Gráinne de Búrca, "The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-evaluation" (2010) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 327.

<sup>70</sup> Robert Howse, "From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading System" (2002) 96 AJIL 94.

<sup>71</sup> Markus Krajewski, "Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law" (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 167.

<sup>72</sup> Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 453.

<sup>73</sup> Daniel Esty, "The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis" (2002) 1 World Trade Review 7.

<sup>74</sup> Gregory Shaffer, "The WTO after the Collapse of the Doha Round: Multilateralism and Its Discontents" (2011) 11 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 403.

<sup>75</sup> Joost Pauwelyn, "The Rule of Law without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus" (2015) 109 AJIL 761.

<sup>76</sup> Debra Steger, Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century (Wilfrid Laurier University Press 2010) 29.

between legal principle and political reality, between economic integration and regulatory diversity, and between judicial independence and democratic legitimacy.

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