BIG TECH MERGERS AND “KILLER ACQUISITIONS”: RE-EVALUATING MERGER CONTROL CRITERIA IN DIGITAL MARKETS

The debate about Big Tech mergers and killer acquisitions is ultimately a debate about the future of competition. A young digital business may have little turnover today but may become an important source of innovation or a meaningful alternative to an established platform. If merger control looks only at present financial size, it may overlook transactions that remove future competitive pressure. The features of digital markets—network effects, data-driven advantages, platform ecosystems and rapid innovation—make this concern worth serious attention. At the same time, the term “killer acquisition” should not be used as a conclusion before the evidence has been assessed. Many acquisitions help new products survive, scale and reach consumers. A product may be discontinued for legitimate commercial or technical reasons. Authorities must therefore identify a plausible theory of harm, examine the target’s realistic prospects without the merger, evaluate the acquirer’s incentives and test claimed efficiencies. India’s deal-value threshold is an important step in addressing the limitations of traditional notification tests. It may bring certain transactions involving low-turnover but high-value targets within the CCI’s review. Its practical value will depend on clear guidance, consistent application and the ability to assess digital-market evidence. The threshold itself does not establish that a transaction is anticompetitive; the substantive assessment under the Competition Act remains decisive. Comparative experience from the United States and European Union reinforces the need to examine potential competition and innovation while preserving legal certainty and procedural fairness. India should adapt useful lessons to its own statutory framework rather than import foreign rules without regard to domestic conditions. The best approach is neither automatic approval nor automatic suspicion. It is a forward-looking, evidence-based and proportionate system that distinguishes acquisitions which strengthen innovation from those that remove a meaningful competitive threat. Merger control should protect the possibility that tomorrow’s competitor can emerge, while allowing businesses to invest, collaborate and grow where the transaction is consistent with the law.  

1.                Competition Act, 2002 (India), as amended by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. 2.                Competition Commission of India, ‘Know Your Competition Law: Deal Value Threshold Criteria for Merger Review’, Fair Play publication (2024). Available through the CCI official website. 3.                Competition Commission of India, Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024. 4.                Competition Commission of India, FAQs and official materials on regulation of combinations, https://www.cci.gov.in/faqs. 5.                Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer and Song Ma, ‘Killer Acquisitions’ (2021) 129(3) Journal of Political Economy 649–702. 6.                OECD, Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers No. 248 (OECD Publishing, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1787/dac52a99-en. 7.                OECD, OECD Handbook on Competition Policy in the Digital Age (2022), chapter on merger control in digital markets. 8.                OECD, ‘Theories of Harm for Digital Mergers’, roundtable materials (2023). 9.                James Mancini, Making Online Markets More Competitive: The Benefits and Challenges of Conglomerate Merger Review, OECD Going Digital Toolkit Notes No. 3 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1787/c6389cbb-en. 10.             U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines (2023).