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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
-
Paper ID:
IJSREM68402
Volume:
10 |
10 |
Oct 2026
Pages:
1-6
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

SRM School of Law
SRM University
Insider trading has become difficult to police inside any single legal system because the people who hold confidential information, the companies that issue securities and the markets that trade them are frequently located in different countries. This paper examines how that mismatch weakens securities regulation and enforcement. Using a doctrinal and comparative method, it studies the insider trading frameworks of the United States, the European Union and India, and then reviews the cooperative machinery, chiefly the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, through which regulators try to bridge national boundaries. The analysis identifies six recurring obstacles: overlapping and uncertain jurisdiction, divergent legal definitions of the offence, difficulty in obtaining evidence located abroad, opaque trading structures, the risk of duplicate punishment across states, and unequal enforcement capacity. Short case studies show how these obstacles appear in practice. The paper argues that the weakest point is not the absence of prohibitions but the gap between domestic rules and the tools available to enforce them across borders, and it proposes a set of targeted reforms covering convergent definitions, stronger information-sharing powers, protocols for allocating cases between states, and capacity building for smaller regulators.
KEYWORDS
The central difficulty in policing cross-border insider trading is a structural one: markets and information move across borders, while investigative powers and sanctions stop at them. The three systems examined here all prohibit the conduct, but they do so on different legal theories, claim reach in different ways, and depend on foreign partners for much of the evidence that decides a case. The existing cooperation framework has narrowed the gap, yet it remains a framework of expectations rather than obligations. This does not call for a single global insider trading code, which would be politically unrealistic. A more achievable path combines convergence on core concepts, stronger and better-protected information-sharing, some agreed method for deciding who proceeds, and support for regulators with the least capacity. Future work could test these ideas with enforcement data, examine additional jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Singapore, and study how new asset classes, including crypto-assets traded across multiple platforms, strain the same arrangements.
[1] . Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market. New York, NY, USA: Free Press, 1966. [2] U. Bhattacharya and H. Daouk, “The world price of insider trading,” J. Finance, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 75–108, Feb. 2002. [3] Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). [4] SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). [5] Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). [6] United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). [7] Salman v. United States, 580 U.S. 39 (2016). [8] United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). [9] SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). [10] Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 21A, 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78u-1, 78ff; SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b5-1.
Publication Date
10/27/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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Conflict of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest related to this research work.
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