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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
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Paper ID:
IJSREM62671
Volume:
10 |
5 |
May 2026
Pages:
1-6
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

Artificial Intelligence and Data Science
Knowledge Institute of Technology

Artificial Intelligence and Data Science
Knowledge Institute of Technology

Artificial Intelligence and Data Science
Knowledge Institute of Technology

Artificial Intelligence and Data Science
Knowledge Institute of Technology

Artificial Intelligence and Data Science
Knowledge Institute of Technology
Cryptographic hash functions are typically designed by hand, evaluated through years of community analysis, and replaced only after a public break. There is no automated feedback loop between attack discovery and design improvement. We present CryptoForge, a system that closes this loop. CryptoForge pairs a parameterized matrix-based hash function (MatriXHash-256) with a Gohr-style neural differential distinguisher, a Walsh-Hadamard spectral analysis engine, and an evolutionary defender that modifies hash parameters in response to discovered weaknesses. The hash operates over GF(28) using a 32×32 Cauchy MDS matrix with branch number 33 and the AES S-box. The neural adversary trains on self-generated differential pairs and measures a “security margin”—the round count at which distinguishing accuracy falls to 50%. The spectral engine computes a fixed-dimensional fingerprint (nonlinearity, differential uniformity, spectral flatness, entropy) that predicts adversary success cheaply, without training. Over 8 generations of co-evolution, the system drove S-box nonlinearity from 94 to 112, independently rediscovering the AES S-box. We also report two empirical findings: a binary security cliff at nonlinearity ≈80, where neural accuracy transitions sharply from near-perfect to chance; and an R2 collapse in spectral-neural regression from 0.998 to 0.059 when the identity S-box outlier is removed, indicating the security landscape has a threshold rather than a gradient. A C implementation achieves 105× speedup over the Python baseline. The full system passes NIST SP 800-22 (10/10 tests), achieves perfect avalanche (mean 0.5000), and zero BIC violations across 1,044,480 bit pairs..
KEYWORDS
CryptoForge demonstrates that adversarial co-evolution is a viable approach to automated hash function design. A neural attacker finds weaknesses; a spectral engine provides cheap algebraic estimates; an evolutionary defender modifies the design; the cycle repeats. Over 8 generations, the system independently converged on the AES S-box. The binary security cliff at NL ≈ 80 and the R² collapse are empirical findings about the structure of the design space that, to our knowledge, have not been previously reported. The source code, trained models, web interface, and all 17 result files are publicly available.¹
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Publication Date
5/6/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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