SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN 5G SERVICE-BASED ARCHITECTURE (SBA)

The proposed 5G SBA Vulnerability Assessment and Detection Framework provides a systematic approach for identifying and analyzing security weaknesses in the Service-Based Architecture of 5G core networks. The framework focuses on critical Network Functions and Service-Based Interfaces, considering vulnerabilities related to authentication, authorization, API security, HTTP/2 communication, service discovery, Network Function exposure, and cloud-native deployment. The proposed methodology combines vulnerability identification, attack-surface analysis, risk classification, traffic monitoring, and security evaluation to provide a comprehensive view of the 5G SBA security landscape. The evaluation demonstrates that continuous monitoring and structured vulnerability assessment can improve the identification of malicious SBI traffic and critical security weaknesses. Strong authentication, mutual TLS, API authorization, input validation, rate limiting, certificate management, and network segmentation can further reduce the impact of identified threats. The framework therefore provides a scalable foundation for improving the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and resilience of 5G core networks. Overall, the proposed approach can assist network operators and security administrators in prioritizing vulnerabilities and implementing appropriate mitigation mechanisms for secure 5G SBA deployments.

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