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Paper ID:IJSREM69273

GOVERNOR’S DISCRETION AND FEDERALISM : HAS THE CONSTITUTION CREATED A CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK ?

Stream/Area:

-

Subject:

-

Paper ID:

IJSREM69273

Volume:

10 |

11 |

Nov 2026

Pages:

1-16

Publication Frequency:

Monthly (12 issues per year)

DOI
Digital Object Identifier
10.55041/IJSREM69273

License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

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Authors

PP

PRACHI PAREEK

LL.M. (Intellectual Property)

Amity University, Noida

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Mentors

PBB

Prof. BHAVNA BATRA

LL.M. (Intellectual Property)

Amity University, Noida

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Abstract

The office of the Governor occupies a distinctive position in the constitutional structure of India. The Governor is the constitutional head of a State, while the real executive authority ordinarily rests with the elected Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. Although this arrangement is intended to maintain constitutional continuity and responsible government, disagreements between Governors and elected State governments have increasingly raised questions about the scope of gubernatorial discretion and its effect on Indian federalis. The controversy becomes particularly significant when a Governor delays action on Bills passed by a State Legislature, reserves Bills for the consideration of the President, or exercises discretion in circumstances involving a conflict with the elected government. Articles 163, 200 and 201 provide the constitutional framework for examining these issues. However, the absence of an expressly prescribed general deadline for decisions under Articles 200 and 201 has raised concerns about legislative uncertainty and the possibility of constitutional deadlock. This paper examines whether such deadlock is an unavoidable consequence of the constitutional design, or the result of an expansive interpretation of the Governor’s powers. It analyses the constitutional position of the Governor, the relationship between discretion and ministerial advice, and the role of judicial review in maintaining the balance between the Union and the States. The paper argues that the Constitution does not expressly establish a general mechanism for resolving every disagreement or delay involving gubernatorial discretion. Nevertheless, constitutional silence should not be interpreted as unrestricted authority. The problem lies in the interaction between ambiguous constitutional language, political disagreements, institutional conventions, and the limits of judicial intervention. A clearer framework for decision-making, greater transparency, and respect for representative government are necessary to ensure that the Governor’s office operates as a constitutional safeguard rather than a source of legislative uncertainty.

KEYWORDS

Governor’s discretionary powers Indian federalism Constitutional deadlock Governor and state government Indian Constitution Centre-State relations Constitutional governance Governor’s role in India Federal constitutional disputes Constitutional accountability

Cite This Article

PRACHI PAREEK, Prof. BHAVNA BATRA, "GOVERNOR’S DISCRETION AND FEDERALISM : HAS THE CONSTITUTION CREATED A CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK ?," International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management, vol. 10, no. 11, pp. 1-16, Nov 2026. https://doi.org/10.55041/IJSREM69273

Full Article/Conclusion

The relationship between gubernatorial discretion and federalism reveals an important tension within India’s constitutional system. The Governor is expected to perform constitutional functions impartially while the elected State government is responsible for implementing policies supported by its legislative majority. Neither role can be understood in isolation from the principles of responsible government and constitutional supremacy. Articles 163, 200 and 201 provide the legal framework for the Governor’s role in executive and legislative matters. However, the absence of a general numerical deadline for action on Bills creates uncertainty, particularly where political disagreement accompanies constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s decisions, especially those delivered in 2025, demonstrate that the issue cannot be reduced to a simple choice between unrestricted gubernatorial discretion and automatic acceptance of ministerial advice. The April 2025 judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu addressed the constitutional consequences of delay and the reservation of reconsidered Bills. Subsequently, the November 2025 Presidential Reference opinion clarified that the Governor exercises discretion under Article 200, that courts should not impose general timelines or create deemed assent and that prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction may nevertheless justify limited judicial intervention. The central question is therefore not whether the Constitution has failed to provide any mechanism for resolving disputes. It is whether the available mechanisms are effective enough to prevent constitutional powers from being instruments of prolonged institutional obstruction.  This paper concludes that the Constitution creates a possibility of constitutional deadlock but does not make such deadlock inevitable. The risk arises when constitutional discretion is exercised without sufficient transparency, institutions fail to communicate their concerns and political disagreements interfere with the ordinary functioning of representative government. The way forward lies in clearer procedures, greater institutional restraint, reasoned communication and respect for the federal distribution of powers. The Governor’s office should neither be reduced to a purely ceremonial formality nor treated as an independent political authority. Its legitimacy depends on the careful exercise of constitutional responsibility.   Ultimately, the success of Indian federalism depends not merely on the powers written into the Constitution but also on the willingness of constitutional authorities to exercise those powers in a manner that preserves democratic accountability, legislative effectiveness and constitutional trust.

References

a.           Primary Sources Constitutional provisions Constitution of India, arts. 143, 153–155, 163–164, 174, 200–201, 245–246, 254, 356 and 361. Cases i.            Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831. ii.          S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1. iii.        Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1. iv.         State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 481. v.          In Re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, 2025 INSC 1333.     b.           Reports i.            Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988). ii.          Punchhi Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations (2010).     c.           Official and Secondary Legal Resources i.            Supreme Court of India, official judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 8 April 2025. ii.          Supreme Court of India, official opinion in Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, 20 November 2025. iii.        Supreme Court Reports and recognised legal reporting services for the cited judgments. iv.         Constitutional law commentaries addressing Indian federalism, parliamentary government and the office of the Governor.

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Publication Date

11/20/2026

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