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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
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Paper ID:
IJSREM69212
Volume:
10 |
11 |
Nov 2026
Pages:
1-7
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
This paper develops an auditable procedure for prioritizing physical and cybersecurity investments when funding, staff capacity, and evidence are limited. Security budgets often separate physical and cyber protection even when both sustain the same service. A critical integrative review informs a finite-scenario binary portfolio model incorporating mandatory measures, prerequisites, lifecycle costs, and complementary controls. The working proposition is that ranking actions individually by value-to-cost ratio does not, in general, yield the feasible portfolio with the best worst-case assessed value. The objective maximizes the lowest assessed protection value across explicitly stated scenarios without interpreting stakeholder value points as expected monetary loss. An entirely hypothetical six-action instance is solved by exhaustive enumeration. Under the stated assumptions, the robust portfolio attains a minimum value of 12 points, compared with 9 for a specified ratio-based heuristic and 8 for the scenario-specific optimum. Sensitivity analysis identifies budget plateaus, staff bottlenecks, and infeasible recommendations caused by omitted prerequisites. These are mathematical properties of the constructed instance, not measured security improvements. The contribution is a transparent connection between prioritization, portfolio feasibility, uncertainty, and accountable acceptance of residual exposure.
KEYWORDS
Prioritizing physical and cybersecurity under limited budgets is a constrained decision about protection capabilities. Individual risk rankings or value-to-cost ratios cannot generally determine a feasible portfolio when actions require prerequisites, compete for staff, or produce complementary value. A credible decision process must also distinguish mandatory service conditions from discretionary improvements and retain uncertainty about the evidence supporting each action. This paper provides an auditable procedure and a finite-scenario binary formulation connecting those requirements. The hypothetical example demonstrates the logic: the selected robust portfolio differs from both a specified ratio heuristic and a scenario-specific optimum; extra funding has no value over part of the examined range; and an omitted prerequisite produces an inadmissible recommendation. These conclusions follow from the declared mathematical instance and do not establish operational effectiveness. The study has limitations. The literature review is targeted rather than exhaustive, and the illustration is hypothetical and uncalibrated. The model assumes a fixed baseline, a single planning stage, an aggregated staff constraint, a common cardinal value scale, and only pairwise complementary contributions. The practical contribution is a decision record linking service objectives, candidate actions, resource limits, uncertainty, selected combinations, and residual-risk ownership. Its usefulness in real organizations remains to be evaluated through expert review, elicitation studies, and observed implementation. The model supports accountable judgment; it does not replace the evidence needed to justify a security investment.
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Publication Date
11/20/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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