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ArticlePeer ReviewedOpen AccessPlagiarism Passed
Paper ID:IJSREM39466

Short-Selling Activism and Corporate Governance in India: A Qualitative Study of Market, Regulatory and Board Responses

Stream/Area:

-

Subject:

-

Paper ID:

IJSREM39466

Volume:

8 |

12 |

Dec 2024

Pages:

1-3

Publication Frequency:

Monthly (12 issues per year)

DOI
Digital Object Identifier
10.55041/IJSREM39466

License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

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Authors

DHP

Dr Harsh Purohit

Finance

FMS-WISDOM, Banasthali Vidyapith, Jaipur

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CAB

CS Amitava Banerjee

Finance

FMS-WISDOM, Banasthali Vidyapith, Jaipur

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Abstract

Short-seller reports on Indian listed companies are often seen as either market abuse or shareholder activism. This paper instead explores them from a governance perspective. It reviews public documents (company statements, exchange filings, regulatory communications, and press coverage) around the Hindenburg Research report on the Adani Group, Eros International (Mangrove Partners and other short sellers, from about 2015), and asks what boards, institutional investors, and regulators did once the allegations surfaced. Three things stand out. Boards with credible independent directors and effective audit processes responded with evidence-based, procedural answers, while promoter-led boards leaned on denial and legal threats. Institutional investors asked harder questions, though mostly out of public view. The regulatory response counted for as much as the allegations: slow or mixed signals prolonged the uncertainty. The paper argues that an activist short report acts as an external stress test of a firm's disclosure and oversight, and that the quality of the response matters more than whether the report turns out to be right. Suggestions are made for boards, investors and regulators.

KEYWORDS

short-selling activism corporate governance India board oversight shareholder activism regulatory response.

Cite This Article

Dr Harsh Purohit, CS Amitava Banerjee, "Short-Selling Activism and Corporate Governance in India: A Qualitative Study of Market, Regulatory and Board Responses," International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 1-3, Dec 2024. https://doi.org/10.55041/IJSREM39466

Full Article/Conclusion

Short-selling activism has real consequences for corporate governance in India. When institutions respond well, it can improve transparency, sharpen monitoring and prompt correction. When they respond poorly, it breeds uncertainty and reputational harm. The paper's main argument is that an activist short report is best seen as a stress test of a firm's governance, whatever its accuracy. How the board, investors and regulators respond decides whether the episode ends in better accountability or in a prolonged quarrel. The study has clear limits: it rests on public documents, a small number of episodes and interpretive coding. Later work could add interviews with directors and investors, systematic coding of a larger set of campaigns, and comparison with other markets where ownership is also concentrated.

References

[1] Aggarwal, R.K., Wu, G.: Stock Market Manipulations. J. Bus. 79(4), 1915–1954 (2006) [2] Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F., Thomas, R.: Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance. J. Finance 63(4), 1729–1775 (2008) [3] Diamond, D.W., Verrecchia, R.E.: Constraints on Short-Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information. J. Financ. Econ. 18(2), 277–311 (1987) [4] Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H.: Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. J. Financ. Econ. 3(4), 305–360 (1976) [5] Karpoff, J.M., Lou, X.: Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct. J. Finance 65(5), 1879–1913 (2010) [6] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.: Corporate Ownership Around the World. J. Finance 54(2), 471–517 (1999) [7] Spence, M.: Job Market Signaling. Q. J. Econ. 87(3), 355–374 (1973) [8] Freeman, R.E.: Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Pitman, Boston (1984) [9] Securities and Exchange Board of India: SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, as amended [10] Government of India: The Companies Act, 2013 [11] Ebix: This House of “Cards” Seems To Have a Glaring Fake Revenue Problem – Hindenburg Research

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Publication Date

12/27/2024

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Double-Blind Peer Review

Review Rounds: 2

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