Loading article...
Loading article...
Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
-
Paper ID:
IJSREM61954
Volume:
10 |
4 |
April 2026
Pages:
1-5
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.
School of Computer Science and Information Technology
Jain (Deemed to be University), Jayanagar, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India.
School of Computer Science and Information Technology
Jain (Deemed to be University), Jayanagar, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India.
School of Computer Science and Information Technology
Jain (Deemed to be University), Jayanagar, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India.
School of Computer Science and Information Technology
Jain (Deemed to be University), Jayanagar, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has appeared as a edged weapon, in the field of cybersecurity. It improves threat detection, incident response and predictive analytics while simultaneously enabling cybercriminals to craft sophisticated as well as attack methods. Conventional security systems encounter difficulties due, to AI-powered assaults like deepfake phishing, adversarial machine learning, automated malware generation, and intelligent botnets. These Attacks evolve rapidly bypass signature-based systems and exploit vulnerabilities, at machine velocity. This study aims to investigate the growing occurrence of cyberattacks driven by AI and propose strategic countermeasures to reduce their impact. An extensive review of literature, consultations, with experts and examination of case studies were all. This was a component of the analytical research framework employed. Structured questionnaires served as the tool, for data collection. Information from cybersecurity experts on perceived policy gaps, current defensive capabilities, and awareness of AI dangers. To understand attack trends supplementary data was collected from trustworthy cybersecurity sources. like IBM X-Force and MITRE ATT&CK. Model poisoning, evasion attacks, explainability issues in AI systems, Inadequate regulatory frameworks rank among the challenges highlighted by the research. A tactical mitigation a system encompassing machine learning-driven detection, methods, for resilience ethical AI principles fundamentals, with observation recommended through thematic and statistical evaluation. This research highlights the critical need for enhanced governance practices, sophisticated threat-intelligence sharing models, and adaptive and AI-augmented defense systems. By bridging current gaps between AI innovation and cybersecurity governance, the research seeks to assist organizations in creating forward-thinking digital security frameworks.
KEYWORDS
The study clearly shows that AI-powered cyber-attacks are becoming one of the biggest risks in today’s digital world. Unlike traditional attacks, AI based threats can learn, adapt and act on their own, which makes them harder to detect Attackers are now using AI to create extremely convincing fake voices and videos and even trick other AI systems into making mistakes. These advanced capabilities allow attackers to pass through past security tools that were designed for older, simpler types of threats. As a result, our current security systems are no longer updated on their own. To effectively protect networks and data, organizations must start using stronger, AI-powered defense systems that can analyze patterns, react instantly, and learn from new attacks. The research suggests a plan focusing on: • Robust machine learning–based detection • Adversarial defense techniques • Ethical AI policies • Continuous monitoring and threat intelligence sharing • Stronger governance and regulatory frameworks.
[1] Goodfellow, I., Shlens, J., & Szegedy, C. (2015). Adversarial examples: Small perturbations that fool deep neural networks. [2] Szegedy, C., et al. (2014). Intriguing properties of neural networks and adversarial transferability. [3] Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2017). CW attacks: Breaking proposed defenses. [4] Moosavi-Dezfooli, S., et al. (2017). Universal adversarial perturbations. [5] Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., & Bengio, S. (2017). [6] Adversarial examples in the physical world. Eykholt, K., et al. (2018). [7] Robust physical attacks on autonomous vehicle sign recognition. Brown, T., et al. (2018). [8] Adversarial patch attacks in real-world settings. Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2018). [9] Targeted adversarial attacks on speechto-text. Sharif, M., et al. (2016). Adversarial accessories to evade face recognition systems. [10] Elsayed, G., Goodfellow, I., & SohlDickstein, J. (2019). Adversarial reprogramming of neural models. [11] Gu, T., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Garg, S. (2017). BadNets: Identifying backdoor poisoning in neural networks. [12] Chen, X., et al. (2017). Targeted backdoor poisoning attack methods. [13] Liu, Y., et al. (2018). Trojaning attacks against deep neural networks. [14] Shafahi, A., et al. (2018). Poison Frogs: Cleanlabel poisoning attacks. [15] Biggio, B., et al. (2012). Data poisoning [16] Madry, A., et al. (2018). PGD-based adversarial training for robustness. [17] Athalye, A., et al. (2018). Obfuscated gradients: Challenging ineffective defenses. [18] Tramèr, F., et al. (2018). Transferability and ensemble adversarial training. [19] Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2017). CW attacks: Breaking proposed defenses. [20] Moosavi-Dezfooli, S., et al. (2017). Universal adversarial perturbations. [21] Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., & Bengio, S. (2017). Adversarial examples in the physical world. [22] Eykholt, K., et al. (2018). Robust physical attacks on recognition. autonomous vehicle sign [23] Brown, T., et al. (2018). Adversarial patch attacks in real-world settings. [24] Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2018). Targeted adversarial attacks on speech-to-text. [25] Sharif, M., et al. (2016). Adversarial accessories to evade face recognition systems. [26] Elsayed, G., Goodfellow, I., & SohlDickstein, J. (2019). Adversarial reprogramming of neural models. [27] Gu, T., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Garg, S. (2017). BadNets: Identifying backdoor poisoning in neural networks. [28] Chen, X., et al. (2017). Targeted backdoor poisoning attack methods. [29] Liu, Y., et al. (2018). Trojaning attacks against deep neural networks. [30] Shafahi, A., et al. (2018). Poison Frogs: Cleanlabel poisoning attacks. [31] Biggio, B., et al. (2012). Data poisoning attacks on SVM learning models. [32] Madry, A., et al. (2018). PGD-based adversarial training for robustness. [33] Athalye, A., et al. (2018). Obfuscated gradients: Challenging defenses. ineffective [34] Tramèr, F., et al. (2018). Transferability and ensemble adversarial training. [35] Athalye, A., et al. (2018). EOT framework for robust physical attacks. [36] Ilyas, A., et al. (2019). Adversarial examples as non-robust features. [37] Su, J., Vargas, D., & Sakurai, K. (2019). One-pixel adversarial attack. [38] Papernot, N., et al. (2017). Black-box attacks using substitute models. [39] Papernot, N., et al. (2016). Defensive distillation technique. [40] Moosavi-Dezfooli, S., et al. (2016). DeepFool: Minimal perturbation algorithm. [41] Kurakin, A., et al. (2017). Scaling adversarial training. [42] Buckman, J., et al. (2018). Thermometer encoding defense framework. [43] Tramèr, F., et al. (2016). Model extraction via prediction API queries. [44] Shokri, R., et al. (2017). Membership inference attacks on ML models. [45] Fredrikson, M., et al. (2015). Model inversion attacks revealing private attributes. [46] Hitaj, B., Ateniese, G., & Perez-Cruz, F. (2017). GAN-based collaborative learning leakage. [47] Wang, B., et al. (2019). Neural Cleanse: Backdoor trigger detection. [48] Liu, K., et al. (2018). Fine-pruning strategy for backdoor removal [49] Tran, B., Li, J., & Madry, A. (2018). Spectral signature poison detection. [50] Bagdasaryan, E., et al. (2020). Federated learning backdoor attacks. [35] Bhagoji, A., etc.
Publication Date
4/30/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
Documents
Article Views
0
Total views since publication
PDF Downloads
3
Total downloads since publication
Geographic Reach
5
Digital Preservation: This article is permanently archived on Zenodo and complies with all data preservation standards across major indexing platforms.
Plagiarism Screening
This manuscript has been checked for plagiarism using TurnitinPlagiarismChecker software.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest related to this research work.
Funding Information
No funding information available for this research.
Related research in the same subject area
Loading similar articles...