NITI and NYAYA in Amartya Sen’s Theory of Justice: From Institutional Policy to Realized Justice

Sen's approach to justice involves the rejection of dogma, not only in terms of institutionalism (because the state is an institution, which relates to the previous problem with the niti method), but also in terms of exclusion. At least two factors hinder domestic local viewpoints on justice. The nature of injustice in our world is often global, and looking at it solely through the lens of national legislation is too limited for studying and analysing it, as well as for effectively fighting against it. Furthermore, a narrow focus solely on national law disregards international perspectives, limiting the legal domain to a narrow-mindedness that hinders progress in addressing injustice. Sen's focus on expanding comparisons and repeated allusions to the 'impartial spectator' are relevant to this argument. Sen advocates for the incorporation of a more extensive range of comparative, international, and particularly transnational perspectives in legal education, potentially leading to a significant overhaul of Western legal education (Priya, 2022). The primary concept here is that achieving global justice does not necessitate the establishment of a worldwide governing body. Due to the absence of a reliable worldwide authority in the foreseeable future and the urgent and immediate nature of injustices, this approach is characterised by a sense of hope and optimism. Nevertheless, in the absence of a global state, democratic discourse can persist. Indeed, global democracy is currently being implemented, albeit to a certain extent. Nevertheless, this optimistic perspective can only be rationalised if we embrace a noninstitutional Nyaya concept of democracy, wherein "democracy is no longer exclusively defined by the aspiration for public voting, but rather, more comprehensively, by what John Rawls referred to as "the practice of public reason". The nyaya-concept method has gained recognition in India through multiple rulings by the Indian Judiciary. The recent significant ruling in the case of Puttuswamy versus Union of India36 draws upon Sen's democratic-Nyaya approach by affirming that the elements of development, such as political liberty and democratic rights, are essential. Thus affirming the opposing decision made by Justice Khanna in the case of ADM Jabalpur vs Shivakanth Shukla. This demonstrates that law encompasses not only ethical principles but also the administration of justice. The Nyaya-centric approach involves the implementation of law in a manner that is fair and equitable. The ideals of dialogue and justice serve as a criterion to measure the unfairness of law enforcement. Part IV of Amartya Sen's book "Idea of Justice", titled "Public Reasoning and Democracy", was referenced in Pradeshiya. The case of Jan Jati Vikas Manch and Others v. State of UP and Others played a crucial role in safeguarding the civil and political rights of Scheduled Tribes and ensuring their representation in local governance—the case of B.K. Pavitre v. Union of India referenced Amartya Sen's work, Merit and Justice, as a valuable resource for comprehending the role of merit in establishing social structure and mitigating economic inequality. Consequently, the Court concluded that providing reservations to S.C.s and SCTs did not contravene the principle of meritocracy. The Supreme Court ruled that merit should not be confined to inflexible standards like test scores but should instead aim for societal equity. These instances demonstrate that Amartya Sen's concept of justice when applied in practice, can withstand scrutiny based on actual justice served rather than perceived justice. Sen's concept, based on extensive literature, boils down to a simple fundamental point: There are cases of severe injustice that demand immediate action, and the pursuit of the perfect idea of justice may not be helpful in the short term. Therefore, in order to summarise Amartya Sen's philosophy, one can examine the character of Pip from Charles Dickens's novel and discover that "what motivates" us, reasonably enough, is not the realisation that the world falls short of being completely just, which few of us expect – but that there are clearly remediable injustices around us which we want to eliminate." Thereby, the conclusion is to reduce injustice in the world rather than strive for justice.

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