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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
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Paper ID:
IJSREM69152
Volume:
10 |
11 |
Nov 2026
Pages:
1-18
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

College of Management & Computer Application
MIT Art, Design and Technology University

College of Management & Computer Application
MIT Art, Design and Technology University
Quantum computing has moved from a theoretical physics curiosity to a board-level financial risk. Because financial infrastructure runs almost entirely on public-key cryptography — RSA and elliptic-curve algorithms that secure SWIFT messaging, core banking systems, trading platforms, and custody records — a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) would not merely disrupt IT operations; it would undermine the confidentiality and integrity guarantees that global finance is built on. This paper examines quantum-safe cryptography through the lens of an MBA FinTech and business-strategy candidate rather than a cryptography researcher. It frames the "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) threat as an immediate balance-sheet and reputational liability, not a distant technical problem; evaluates the cost and return-on-investment trade-offs of migrating legacy core banking systems to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC); and situates the discussion within the regulatory directives now shaping bank behaviour, including NIST's FIPS 203/204/205 standards, the Bank for International Settlements' (BIS) Project Leap, and the G7 Cyber Expert Group's 2026 migration roadmap. Drawing on real-world pilots at HSBC and JPMorgan Chase, the paper proposes a four-phase strategic migration roadmap — discovery, prioritisation, hybrid deployment, and governance — and argues that quantum-safe resilience is fast becoming a source of competitive advantage rather than a compliance cost. The central takeaway for financial leaders is that the migration decision is no longer whether to act, but how quickly and in what sequence, given multi-year implementation timelines and a market that is already rewarding early movers with trust and access.
KEYWORDS
Quantum-safe cryptography sits at an unusual intersection for financial leaders: the underlying technology risk is genuinely uncertain in timing, yet the required response is not. NIST's finalised standards mean the primary constraint on migration is no longer algorithmic — it is organisational discovery, vendor coordination, and capital sequencing. The "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" threat converts a future risk into a present one for any institution holding long-lived sensitive data, which describes nearly every bank, insurer, and asset manager. And the regulatory signal, from NIST through BIS to the G7 Cyber Expert Group, has moved decisively from research-stage interest to coordinated, phased expectation over the 2025–2035 window. Three strategic recommendations follow directly from the analysis in this paper: 1. Treat discovery as the first and most urgent budget line. An institution cannot prioritise, hybridise, or govern cryptographic assets it has not inventoried; the discovery phase is comparatively inexpensive and de-risks every subsequent phase of the roadmap in Section 6. 2. Extend quantum-readiness into vendor and counterparty risk management now, not after core systems are migrated, since network effects mean an institution's own migration delivers only partial protection until its critical counterparties — card networks, correspondent banks, cloud and HSM vendors — migrate as well. 3. Build cryptographic agility as the durable capability, treating the current PQC transition as the first of what will likely be several future cryptographic transitions, rather than a one-time project to be completed and forgotten. For CFOs and CISOs, the business case increasingly resembles other infrastructure resilience investments made in advance of a known but unpredictably timed shock: the expected cost of early, orderly migration is a known and bounded number, while the expected cost of a late, disorderly one is unbounded and reputationally severe. Institutions that treat quantum-safe resilience as a genuine strategic capability — visible to regulators, counterparties, and increasingly to institutional clients conducting cryptographic due diligence — are positioning quantum readiness not merely as a defensive necessity but as a differentiator in a financial system where trust in the integrity of a transaction is, ultimately, the product being sold.
Bank for International Settlements. (2025). Quantum-readiness for the financial system: A roadmap. BIS Innovation Hub. https://www.bis.org Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub. (2025). Project Leap: Quantum-proofing payment systems (Phase 2 report). https://www.bis.org/publ/othp107.pdf G7 Cyber Expert Group. (2026). Advancing a coordinated roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography in the financial sector [Statement]. U.S. Department of the Treasury and Bank of England. https://home.treasury.gov National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2024). FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard. U.S. Department of Commerce. https://csrc.nist.gov National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2024). FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard. U.S. Department of Commerce. https://csrc.nist.gov National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2024). FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard. U.S. Department of Commerce. https://csrc.nist.gov National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2024, August). NIST releases first 3 finalized post-quantum encryption standards [Press release]. https://www.nist.gov HSBC Holdings plc. (2024). HSBC pilots quantum-safe technology for tokenised gold [Media release]. https://www.hsbc.com HSBC Holdings plc. (2025). HSBC and quantum [Corporate disclosure]. https://www.hsbc.com/who-we-are/hsbc-and-digital/hsbc-and-quantum ISACA Journal. (2025). Building resilient security in the age of quantum computing. ISACA Journal, 2025(6). https://www.isaca.org The Quantum Insider. (2026). Post-quantum cryptography timelines: When will organizations migrate? https://thequantuminsider.com Global Risk Institute. (2024). Quantum threat timeline report (expert survey). Referenced in: Securing cryptography in the age of quantum computing and AI. arXiv:2603.06969.
Publication Date
11/20/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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