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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
-
Paper ID:
IJSREM67441
Volume:
10 |
9 |
Sep 2026
Pages:
1-5
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Jyoti Vidhyapeth Woman's University, Jaipur
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Jyoti Vidhyapeth Woman's University, Jaipur
Tool-enabled large language model agents can retrieve content, call external tools, and initiate actions. These capabilities also create exposure to prompt injection, unsafe tool use, data leakage, and poorly bounded autonomy. This paper documents AgentGuard, a CPU-only prototype that combines a lexical Secure Runtime Monitoring Protocol (SRMP), a six-factor Adaptive Agent Risk Scoring model (AARS), and a Risk-Adaptive Scheduling State Machine (RASS). The study analyses archived simulation records rather than a new deployment experiment. In the primary 200-event simulation, the combined pipeline produced a precision of 0.905, recall of 0.792, F1 of 0.844, and specificity of 0.974 against SRMP-linked reference labels. Across ten fixed-seed runs, mean F1 was 0.791 (SD 0.051; run-level bootstrap 95% CI 0.760-0.819). The lexical layer was vulnerable to evasion: detection fell from 0.76 on original attack prompts to 0.12 after synonym substitution and combined perturbations, while recall on a 64-prompt internal benchmark was 0.529. Because some labels are generated from SRMP output, the evaluation is not independent. The findings are therefore an internal characterization of an inspectable prototype, not evidence of operational detection performance. The paper identifies the validation needed before deployment-oriented claims can be made.
KEYWORDS
AgentGuard shows how lexical monitoring, composite risk scoring, and adaptive control can be assembled in a small, inspectable runtime prototype. In the archived simulations, the main run records F1=0.844 and the ten-seed mean is 0.791. The equal-weight ablation also shows how strongly the decision depends on the security factor. At the same time, the evidence sets firm limits on the claim: lexical transformations sharply reduce detection, recall on the internal benchmark is modest, labels overlap with SRMP output, and latency is simulated rather than measured. The present contribution is therefore an auditable research baseline, not a deployment-ready security claim. AgentGuard preserves event-level records and exposes each stage of its control logic, making it possible to investigate failure rather than treating the monitor as a black box. The next phase should introduce independently adjudicated labels, public agent benchmarks, semantic and trace-based monitors alongside the lexical rules, measured enforcement overhead, and an explicit analysis of how false interventions affect task completion. That evidence is needed before the prototype can be assessed as an operational runtime defence.
[1] OWASP GenAI Security Project, “LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection,” OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, 2024. [2] M. Mazeika et al., “HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal,” in Proc. ICML, 2024. [3] M. Andriushchenko et al., “AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents,” in Proc. ICLR, 2025. [4] Q. Zhan, Z. Liang, Z. Ying, and D. Kang, “InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents,” in Findings of ACL, 2024. [5] H. Zhang et al., “Agent Security Bench: Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-Based Agents,” in Proc. ICLR, 2025. [6] C. Autio et al., Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1, 2024. [7] OWASP GenAI Security Project, State of Agentic AI Security and Governance, ver. 2.01, 2026. [8] Y. Mou et al., “ToolSafe: Enhancing Tool Invocation Safety of LLM-Based Agents via Proactive Step-Level Guardrail and Feedback,” arXiv:2601.10156, 2026. [9] “Runtime Policy Enforcement for MCP-Based LLM Agents,” Electronics, 2026. [10] A. H. Müller et al., “Classifier Calibration: A Survey on How to Assess and Improve Predicted Class Probabilities,” Machine Learning, vol. 112, pp. 3211–3260, 2023.
Publication Date
9/24/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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The authors declare no conflict of interest related to this research work.
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