Loading article...
Loading article...
Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
-
Paper ID:
IJSREM68047
Volume:
10 |
10 |
Oct 2026
Pages:
1-5
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING
CMR TECHNICAL CAMPUS
ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING
CMR TECHNICAL CAMPUS
ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING
CMR TECHNICAL CAMPUS
ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING
CMR TECHNICAL CAMPUS
ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING
CMR TECHNICAL CAMPUS
Internet-connected embedded devices are increasingly used to monitor and control applications such as buildings, healthcare equipment, manufacturing processes, and environmental systems. Their limited resources, unattended deployment, and wireless interfaces can make it difficult to apply security controls commonly used in larger computing platforms. In particular, a gateway that accepts sensor messages without sufficiently checking their origin may be exposed to device impersonation and data injection. This paper describes a low-cost IoT monitoring prototype that uses an ESP32-based sensor node, a gateway, and a separate test node to examine packet authentication. The sensor node obtains temperature readings from a DHT11 sensor and sends them through ESP-NOW. The design uses the ESP32’s device-specific eFuse identifier as an identifier input and SHA-256 as a hashing primitive, while the gateway checks incoming packets before displaying accepted readings on an OLED and web dashboard. A buzzer is used to indicate rejected traffic. The prototype provides a practical framework for demonstrating node identification and gateway-side validation with commonly available hardware. The security properties depend on how the identifier and digest are combined: a public hardware identifier concatenated with an ordinary hash is not, by itself, a secret authenticator and does not provide reliable replay protection. For deployment, the design should use a keyed message authentication code, protected key provisioning, and a nonce or monotonic sequence number. These considerations are discussed to distinguish the prototype’s observable behaviour from the stronger protections required in a production system.
KEYWORDS
This paper described a low-cost ESP32-based IoT monitoring prototype that combines temperature sensing, ESP-NOW communication, gateway-side packet checks, and local or web-based presentation. A separate test node provides a way to exercise the receiver with unauthorized or malformed traffic. The arrangement is useful for demonstrating why a gateway should validate messages before updating an application-facing display. A central design lesson is that hardware identification and cryptographic authentication serve different purposes. An eFuse-backed identifier can support device registration, but it should not be assumed to be confidential or unforgeable at the protocol level. Similarly, SHA-256 is a hash function rather than a digital-signature algorithm. A robust implementation should authenticate messages with HMAC-SHA-256 or another suitable cryptographic protocol, protect keys against disclosure, and use sequence numbers or nonces to prevent replay. Security claims should be based on tests of the implemented protocol rather than on the presence of a hardware identifier or hash function alone. With these improvements and a documented performance evaluation, the prototype can provide a foundation for studying practical authentication in resource-constrained IoT systems.
[1] Y. Zhang et al., “Design and Implementation of Cost-Effective End-to-End Authentication Protocol for PUF-Enabled IoT Devices,” IEEE Access, 2025. [Verify volume, issue, pages, DOI, and exact title.] [2] S. Kim et al., “Low-Cost No-Touch IoT Security,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2021. [Verify exact title and publication details.] [3] M. Singh et al., “PUF-Based Authentication in IoT Against Strong Physical Adversaries Using Zero-Knowledge Proofs,” IEEE Access, 2023. [Verify exact title and publication details.] [4] A. Kumar et al., “Two-Factor Authentication Using Hardware and Biometrics for IoT Devices,” IEEE Access, 2023. [Verify exact title and publication details before citing.] [5] R. Sharma et al., “Integration of Hardware Security Modules and Permissioned Blockchain in Industrial IoT Networks,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2022. [Verify exact title and publication details.] [6] J. Lee et al., “Formalising an Architectural Model of a Trustworthy Edge IoT Security Gateway,” IEEE, 2021. [Add venue, pages, and DOI after verification.] [7] “PUF-Based Secure Lightweight Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for IoT (PLAKE),” 2022. [Verify authors, venue, and DOI before use.] [8] A. Verma et al., “A PUF-Based Modeling-Attack Resilient Authentication Protocol for IoT Devices,” 2022. [Verify venue and publication details.] [9] K. Patel et al., “On the Security of a PUF-Based Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for IoT Devices,” 2023. [Verify venue and publication details.] [10] X. Jin et al., “A Lightweight Authentication Scheme for Power IoT Based on PUF and Chebyshev Chaotic Map,” IEEE Access, 2024. [Verify exact bibliographic record.]
Publication Date
10/16/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
Documents
Article Views
1
Total views since publication
PDF Downloads
5
Total downloads since publication
Geographic Reach
5
Digital Preservation: This article is permanently archived on Zenodo and complies with all data preservation standards across major indexing platforms.
Plagiarism Screening
This manuscript has been checked for plagiarism using TurnitinPlagiarismChecker software.
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest related to this research work.
Funding Information
No funding information available for this research.
Related research in the same subject area
Loading similar articles...