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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
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Paper ID:
IJSREM66632
Volume:
10 |
8 |
Aug 2026
Pages:
1-32
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.
DEPARTMENT OF 5 YEAR INTERGRATED LAW, BBA LLB
CHRIST ACADEMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, BENGALURU
The swift implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) systems in the healthcare industry and trading infrastructure has always resulted in the development of very high-stakes decision-making which are a complex of adaptive systems, having properties of opacity, feedback, and nonlinear risk propagation. The existing regulatory structures are mainly static and and sectoral fragmented. Therefore, they are not suitable for the regulation of adaptive systems, which are time-varying. The current research work formulates the regulation of AI in the healthcare industry and financial markets as a problem of dynamic risk minimization. The central research problem concerns the design of regulatory architectures that minimize expected social loss: f(x)=a_0+∑_(n=1)^∞▒(a_n cos〖nπx/L〗+b_n sin〖nπx/L〗 ) RminE[L(Ht,Mt∣R)], where (Ht) denotes population health outcomes, (Mt) represents market stability outcomes, and ({R}) is the regulatory regime, subject to constraints on innovation efficiency, information asymmetry, and institutional feasibility. In healthcare, AI-enabled diagnostic and decision-support systems—regulated under adaptive Software as a Medical Device framework like those which are articulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration—operating as a probabilistic classifier which are vulnerable to the distributional shift ((Pt \neq P{t+1})) and model drift. In financial markets, algorithmic trading systems governed under frameworks including the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) generate endogenous volatility through latency-sensitive strategic interaction and high-frequency feedback dynamics. The current study advances majorly three objectives: (i) construction of a unified stochastic representation of various algorithmic risk across healthcare and financial markets; (ii) evaluating the contemporary regulatory instruments, including the risk-tiered architecture of the Artificial Intelligence Act, through the control-theoretic and principal–agent lenses; and (iii) proposing an adaptive governance model with the integration of ex ante certification with continuous ex post supervisory feedbacks. Methodologically, the research also synthesizes the preliminary stochastic process modelling, network contagion analysis, and dynamic game theory. Healthcare AI systems are modelled as a sequential decision process with cumulative regret: RT=t=1∑T(Lt(πt)-Lt(π*)), The main argument is that both intelligent care systems and high-frequency trading architectures can produce systemic externalities due to correlated error structures and feedback amplification. In the healthcare domain, correlated misclassification errors can always lead to population-level harm, whereas in the financial domain, correlated trading strategies can lead to various flash crashes. These phenomena have a similar structure to the stability thresholds in complex networks, where systemic collapse usually happens if the spectral radius of the interaction matrix is satisfied by the condition (\rho(A) > 1). Thus, regulatory design must incorporate dynamic monitoring, stress testing, auditability constraints, and risk measures which are similar to Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) but adjusted for the clinical harm. By framing AI governance as a problem of stochastic control and systemic stability, the study advances a mathematically grounded framework for safeguarding both clinical integrity and market stability in algorithmically mediated environments.
KEYWORDS
The rise of AI in healthcare and financial markets marks not simply a technological shift, but a transformation in the nature of institutional decision-making itself. Systems once governed by human discretion are increasingly mediated by adaptive, probabilistic, and interconnected machine architectures. The law cannot govern such systems effectively through static compliance models alone. This study has argued that the proper legal response lies in reconceiving AI governance as a problem of stochastic control and systemic stability. That shift matters because it recognises that the central task of law is no longer only to assign blame after harm occurs, but to design resilient institutions capable of anticipating, monitoring, and containing algorithmic risk before systemic failure takes hold. In that sense, the future of AI regulation will depend not merely on whether law can keep pace with technology, but on whether law itself can become adaptive, intelligent, and structurally responsive.
Bertsekas DP, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control (4th edn, Athena Scientific 2017). Coglianese C and Lehr D, Regulating by Robot (where separately cited as article, do not repeat as book if not used in book form). Jorion P, Value at Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk (3rd edn, McGraw-Hill 2007). Lewis M, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt (Allen Lane 2014). Lo AW, Adaptive Markets: Financial Evolution at the Speed of Thought (Princeton University Press 2017). Murphy KP, Probabilistic Machine Learning: An Introduction (MIT Press 2022). Pasquale F, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard University Press 2015). Peterson M, An Introduction to Decision Theory (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2017). Quionero-Candela J and others (eds), Dataset Shift in Machine Learning (MIT Press 2009). Simon HA, The Sciences of the Artificial (3rd edn, MIT Press 1996).
Publication Date
8/10/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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