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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
-
Paper ID:
IJSREM63359
Volume:
10 |
5 |
May 2026
Pages:
1-14
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

Law
DES Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune
The trajectory of India's digital economy, accelerated by post-pandemic platformisation and a regulatory architecture still in its formative phase, has produced a peculiar regulatory pathology: user-interface design has migrated from a marketing variable into a juridical instrument capable of overriding statutory autonomy. This paper interrogates the doctrinal collision between two near-simultaneously enacted instruments—the Central Consumer Protection Authority's Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023, framed under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, and Section 6 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. Where a platform deploys deceptive choice architecture to extract data, the act simultaneously constitutes an unfair trade practice and an ab initio vitiation of ‘free, specific, informed, unconditional, and unambiguous’ consent. The result is a regulatory blind spot, a latent double-jeopardy controversy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, and a structural enforcement asymmetry that sophisticated tech conglomerates can arbitrage. Drawing on comparative insights from the EU Digital Services Act and the United States Federal Trade Commission's enforcement experience, this paper advocates a harmonised, ‘Fairness-by-Design’ framework anchored in mandatory interface audits and a formal coordination mechanism between the CCPA and the Data Protection Board of India.
KEYWORDS
The central thesis of this paper has been that the convergence of deceptive design and vitiated consent is not an incidental overlap between two regulatory regimes but a structural feature of the platform-mediated economy. The CCPA Guidelines, 2023, and Section 6 of the DPDP Act, 2023, address the same transactional moment through different conceptual frames and with sharply asymmetric remedial inventories. The result, in the absence of doctrinal harmonisation and institutional coordination, is a regulatory blind spot through which the most sophisticated tech conglomerates can navigate by exploiting the seams between the two regimes. The doctrinal correction is not, however, beyond the reach of the existing statutory architecture. The rule-making powers vested in the Central Government and the two regulators are amply sufficient to co-notify a Fairness-by-Design audit standard, to constitute a Joint Task Force, to require transparency reporting, and to issue interpretive guidance recognising algorithmic coercion as a vitiating factor. The intervention required is administrative imagination rather than legislative renovation. The stakes of this intervention are not modest. India's Next Billion Users will encounter the digital economy not as sophisticated negotiators of terms of service but as users of interfaces designed by parties whose interests are asymmetric to their own. The protective ambition of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, and the DPDP Act, 2023, can be realised in the practical experience of these users only if the legal system regulates the code of the interface and not merely the text of the policy. Doctrine has, in the years since Puttaswamy, supplied the language of dignitary autonomy; statute has, in 2019 and 2023, supplied the architecture of enforcement. What remains is the harder, quieter work of harmonisation—the work of ensuring that two regulators speaking the same descriptive language do so from a coordinated doctrinal vocabulary and a shared institutional discipline. The interface is the contract. The interface must, in consequence, be the object of law.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. (2018). Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679 (WP259 rev.01). Brussels: European Commission. Bamberger, K. A., and Mulligan, D. K. (2015). Privacy on the Ground: Driving Corporate Behavior in the United States and Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bhandari, V., and Sane, R. (2023). A Critique of the DPDP Act, 2023 (NIPFP Working Paper). New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. Brignull, H. (2010). Dark Patterns: User Interfaces Designed to Trick People. darkpatterns.org. Cavoukian, A. (2010). Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles. Toronto: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. Central Consumer Protection Authority. (2023). Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns. Notification No. CCPA/Dark Patterns/2023, dated 30 November 2023. New Delhi: Department of Consumer Affairs. Cialdini, R. B. (2007). Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: HarperBusiness. Cohen, J. E. (2019). Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (Act No. 35 of 2019). New Delhi: Government of India. Department of Consumer Affairs. (2024). Annual Report 2023-24. New Delhi: Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government of India. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Act No. 22 of 2023). New Delhi: Government of India. European Commission. (2024). First Annual Report on the Application of the Digital Services Act. Brussels: European Commission. European Data Protection Board. (2022). Guidelines 03/2022 on Deceptive Design Patterns in Social Media Platform Interfaces. Brussels: EDPB.
Publication Date
5/17/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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