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Stream/Area:
-
Subject:
-
Paper ID:
IJSREM68807
Volume:
10 |
11 |
Nov 2026
Pages:
1-8
Publication Frequency:
Monthly (12 issues per year)
License:International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management follows the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) License, allowing free use and distribution with proper attribution.

Department of Electronics and telecommunication
Priyadarshini college of engineering

Department of Electronics and telecommunication
Priyadarshini college of engineering

Department of Electronics and telecommunication
Priyadarshini college of engineering

Department of Electronics and telecommunication
Priyadarshini college of engineering
Operating systems record failed login attempts in their authentication logs, yet the native logging services do nothing to stop those attempts at the network bounda-ry. This paper presents TOGEPI (Threat-Oriented Guard Engine for Protective Infrastructure), a light-weight Python prototype that joins four tasks into one pipeline: watching security logs, detecting brute-force behavior, extracting and validating the source IPv4 address, and blocking that address through the host firewall. Two implementations are described. The Linux reference version reads authentication logs and issues iptables rules, while the Windows console ver-sion offers a menu-driven interface, a synthetic event simulator and Windows Advanced Firewall com-mands. Detection combines keyword matching with a state-aware sliding window set to five failed attempts within 30 seconds. According to the project thesis, all ten functional test cases passed, and five controlled trials gave a mean detection-to-mitigation time of 0.537 s. Idle monitoring used 0.05%–0.15% CPU and 14.2 MB of RAM in the test environment. We also trace a Windows BLOCK_FAILED status to a code-level cause: the state-deduplication check returned a generic false value that the caller read as a firewall failure. The results are laboratory-scale evidence only, and we treat successful rule creation and independent-ly verified packet dropping as two separate outcomes.
KEYWORDS
TOGEPI is a lightweight host-security tool that links live log monitoring directly to firewall mitigation on both Linux and Windows. It combines log tailing, multi-pattern keyword scanning, a sliding-window frequency counter and IPv4 syntax checking into a detection-and-mitigation chain that runs on ordinary inputs. Controlled experiments tested whether the system behaves as intended, and the passing test cases indicate that most of the algorithms were implemented correctly. The mean time from detection to mitigation was 0.537 s, and idle monitoring used between 0.05% and 0.15% of the CPU. The analysis of the BLOCK_FAILED case clarifies how the host firewall path behaves, but confirming that mitigation really works would need further testing in realistic environments, together with packet-drop statistics.
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Publication Date
11/6/2026
Peer Review Type
Double-Blind Peer Review
Review Rounds: 2
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